Arrows in the Eagle’s claw - solutions to 4GW
This series describes the various types of solutions to modern warfare, herein called fourth generation warfare (4GW). It will attempt to show their relationship to one another and their relative potential. 4GW appears to be the dominant form of warfare in the 21st century, so mastery of it might prove necessary for America’s prosperity or even survival. This is a topology, a wide perspective view of writings about 4GW. Future chapters will examine these divisions in more detail.
Analysts – the foundation of the pyramid
This first class of work provides analysis, drawing on a diverse range of resources including history, military theory, and the social sciences. This is foundational to the development of solutions, for nothing can be done except by luck without a deep understanding of
- our situation (strengths, weaknesses, goals, etc),
- the other players on the world stage (both state and non-state actors),
- and the almost infinite range of scenarios possible in the near and far future.
Since everyone working with 4GW does some combination of analysis and recommendations, I include in this group those whose work focuses on more on description than prescription. Applied to individuals, any simple categorization is somewhat arbitrary.
Readers of journals in this field — such as DNI, Parameters, or the Marine Corps Gazette — will see that this category of work is by far the largest both in volume and number of writers. It includes, just to name a few, Martin van Creveld, David Kilcullen, Chet Richards, and John Robb.
Visionaries — another important component of the foundation
A second foundational group are those proposing radical ideas for the conduct of warfare (beyond anything we can do today) or even visions of new geopolitical regimes. This group plays several essential roles. Their creativity provides new directions to more conventional experts. Their imaginations provide vigor and energy to stimulate others to write about 4GW or even take action. Their writings appeal to both the public and decision-makers in a way that few analysts can equal, communicating the nature of modern war to a large audience.
Thomas Barnett dominates the visionary niche in the 4gW universe. His books illustrate the power of a visionary to shape the discussion of geopolitics. The Iraq War shows the danger of putting visions to the test prematurely – before the necessary institutional apparatus has been created, and sufficient analytic work been done to bridge the gap between innovation and execution.
Moving on to solutions, we need an simple and powerful classification scheme.
People, Ideas, and Hardware. “In that order!” the late Col John R. Boyd, USAF, would thunder at his audiences.
Hardware solutions
Technology was our edge, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) our dream team. Or so it seemed until the middle of the Iraq War. High-tech precision bombing. A host of devices to defeat IED’s. Even instant knowledge in the form of a “ruggedized” laptop computer, loaded with data from social-science research conducted in Iraq.
Somewhere along the way this faith faded, remaining strong only among a few true believers — such as at the Pentagon and Popular Mechanics (note recent articles on the Boeing Laser Avenger and Armed Robots). The hot dot moved to…
Ideas, new ways of thinking to defeat new modes of war
This phase began with the rise of figures, such as David Kilcullen and General Petraeus. Another indication: the sale in large numbers of books describing new ways to fight wars, like those by Col Thomas X. Hammes (USMC, retired) and Col Douglas MacGregor (USA, retired), and Lt Col John A. Nagl (USA). Many other innovators have produced work of interest, including William Lind and LTC Greg Wilcox (USA, retired). The public interest in these ideas is so great that the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) was published as a mass-market book.
How many of these new ideas have been put into practice? The history of FM 3-24 illustrates the difficulty of changing well-established practices. Despite its powerful backers, with General Petraeus as our commander in Iraq, the impact of FM 3-24 remains unclear. The new COIN doctrine emphasizes efforts to increase the legitimacy of the government we support and precise applications of force. Our Iraq operations during 2007 have diminished the national government (building bases without their approval, conducting operations they oppose, and arming their opponents) — plus a 4x increase in bombing. Not exactly following the book.
The sad reality: most of the work described above is of theoretical interest only, as it lacks a realistic pathway for implementation. Our difficulty lies not in imagining new ideas, but in implementing them. How do we evolve our massive and famously impervious to reform military apparatus to become a Department of Defense suited for a new century?
People, moving from ideas into practice
The key is organizational change. A focus on technology and ideas ignores the structural basis of present institutional behavior, giving too little attention to the methods which drive reform – and the countervailing forces which must be overcome. Military organizations are conservative, for good reason. Change is difficult to do and its results uncertain. The cost of failure is high.
One of the few works to grapple with these issues is Challenging Transformation’s Clichés by Autulio J. Echevarria II (Strategic Studies Institute, December 2006):
The first cliché is that military transformation is about changing to be better prepared for the future, as if we could somehow separate the future from our current agendas, and as if we had only one future for which to prepare. In fact, transformation is more about the present than the future.
More importantly, grasping new ideas is hardly the most difficult part of any transformation. The ideas behind Gustavus Adolphus’ reform of the Swedish military during the 17th century — which included mobile artillery and greater use of musketry — were not hard to grasp. Likewise, Napoleon’s tactical and operational innovations — which involved combining mass and firepower with self-sufficient army organizations called corps — were not difficult to understand. Nor were the concepts implemented by the German military — which stressed speed of movement and decentralized decision-making – difficult to comprehend.
In fact, the truly hard part about change is managing the change. That requires backing up vague visions and lofty goals with concrete programs that can provide meaningful resources for new roles and functions, and offering incentives or compensation packages capable of appeasing institutional interests, especially the specific interests of those groups or communities most threatened by change.
Heading the list of “people” solutions we have Donald Vandergriff. He identified a powerful point of leverage to change the Army: its personnel system. For example, the Army’s individual replacement system affects not just soldiers, down to the newest recruit, but the quality of units — especially cohesion . Even more critical is the process by which a service recruits, trains, and promotes its officers. Change this and the effects ripple outward through the entire organization over time, as the nature and behavior of its leaders evolve. The Army is making changes in both these areas, responding to the ideas of Vandergriff and others. This success means that Vandergriff is on the cutting edge of America’s 4GW sword.
There must be others in this category! Please tell us about them in the comments.
Notes:
- Beyond the scope of this post are the hundreds of professionals who have proposed incremental improvements in our capabilities, often valuable and inovative.<
- We can see the big picture only through a loss of detail, as an exercise in abstraction. To characterize protean writers with one work — van Creveld as a historian, or John Robb as an analyst — tells us little about their work. The map is not the territory, the name is not the actual object.
Solutions to 4GW, the series
- A solution to 4GW — the introduction
- How to get the study of 4GW in gear
- Arrows in the Eagle’s claw — solutions to 4GW
- Arrows in the Eagle’s claw — 4GW analysts
- Visionaries point the way to success in the age of 4GW
- 4GW: A solution of the first kind - Robots!
- 4GW: A solution of the second kind – Shawn Brimley has provided an example of a solution of the second kind with “A Grand Strategy of Sustainment”. It is good, but we need to move on; solutions of the second kind do us little good.
- 4GW: A solution of the third kind – Don Vandergriff is one of the very few today implementing solutions of the third kind.
There also needs to be a bit (actually a lot) more attention paid to prevention. The old saying “an ounce ….”. This is by far the safest, cheapest and smartest way of operating.
Much more attention needs to be paid on assisting, maintaining and rebuilding States. Any reasonably functional, legitimate State is far, far better than the alternative.
I’ve been struck in recent years at the how much effort has gone into smashing States, and how little in maintaining them. Own goals in recent years:
Iraq - obvious one this, take a (just) second world nation, smash it pieces, kill a million people, turn 4 million into refugees, spend a trillion dollars, fire a couple of billion bulets, fire tons (hundreds?) of DU all over the place. And the Iraqi’s are now calling in the Chinese to get their electricity back up again.
The only winners out of all this debacle in the end are going to be the Russians and Chinese. If they have half a brain (and they seem to do) they are going to win big there in the next 10 years. Iraq in the SCO by (say) 2020 anyone?
Afghanistan - Loath them as you may, but for all the blood, money and effort spent, the average Afghani was better off under the Taliban than now. Amazing. Especially since the Taliban will be back in power again in what, 5 years? The only winner out of this has been the heroin industry, who won big time.
Somalia - just, after decades of turmoil, just starting to form (probably from sheer exhaustion) some sort of national State structure. Wham, our agents smash it pieces again. Brilliant, especially given the fact that the Ethopians are starting run into the quagmire seen in Afghanisatan and Iraq.
Lebanon - what I have always called Israel’s greatest stratgic mistake. Israel was on the point of getting exactly what (says) it wanted. A peaceful, prosperous neighbour to the north. Syrian influence was falling away (though it could never totally disappear as the countries are too close), Hezbollah was steadily morphing into the equivalent of a US State regional government, more interested in business, charity, construction, etc, with a strong vestied interest in a properous and stable national Lebanon (and worked, and is working hard to achieve this). Active fighters (nearly all National Guardsman equivalents, ie part timers) down to 1,000-3,000 (by the best estimates I can find).
A few deft diplomatic moves by the Israelis, some money and investment, even security help and ….. Apart from the obvious advantages (including great economic gains) of having a, at least neutral, northern neighbour, they could have leveraged this .. “look we can work with Arab Govt’s, we want peace and can prove it”. Either they are stupid, self destrctive or greedy, or all 3. When I hear reports of Israel planning to attack again, then I add masochistic to the list. What getting thumped twice is not enough?
Future Targets for State destruction:
Pakistan - very, very wobbly. Classic mistake, work with a favoured ’strong man’ and push him into actions beyond what the culture and society will support. How many times has that happened and failed? Mushariff, if he had half a brain, should have told the US to go and jump and called their bluff to attack Pakistan. When he didn’t everything else was predictable. Best hope for there is, perversely, the US actually trying to carry out their threat to ‘attack’ Pakistan. It will unite the country again.
Iran - current target for ‘regime change’, translated ’smash into bits’. Have they any idea what could replace the current, conservative, semi-democracy? Will it really be a ‘lay down, do everything the US wants (oil, here take all ours)’ regime? Sure and tooth fairies exist as well. I am so looking forward to $300 (more likely now the Euro equivalent) a barrel of oil .. where’s my bicycle again?
Syria - not content with smashing up Lebanon and turning it into far more a threat that it has been, the idea of another ‘regime change’ in Syria must have any regional expert curling their toes. Just as an aside, the Syrian regime must be wondering what they have to do to get on the side of the US. Help against AQ, done. Doing the CIA’s dirty work, done. Offering to diplomatically sort out the Golan’s, done, etc.
Possibilities:
Turkey - just waiting for the calls inm the US for ‘regime change’ in Turkey. They simply will not allow an independent Kurdistan, anyone who thinks otherwise (ie US and Israel)is deluding themselves. So they are on a crash course with the US now. If the EU doesn’t pull its finger out Turkey will (I repeat will) be in the SCO within 10 years.
Saudia Arabia - Still not sure why this one wasn’t first on the list.
The obvious conclusion in all this is that the US (and Israel and, amazingly, supported by the British who should know better) are currently the greatest creators of 4GW conflicts in the world, at massive expense in blood and treasure. Yet they are totally incapable of fighting and winning these conflicts, and trying to do so is destroying their militaries and ruining their economies.
Is it just me or does this just seem self-destructive? I mean no one can be that daft?
Comment by oldskeptic — 19 November 2007 @ 9:16 pm
Also consider Martin van Creveld’s theory that we in the era in which the “Decline of the State” is a dominant trend. States fail or fracture more easily than they are built. Propping up states might cause more trouble than benefit, attempting to stop inevitable evolution.
Comment by fabiusmaximus2000 — 21 November 2007 @ 10:51 pm
I’m sceptical. Creveld is both right and wrong. Where he gets it wrong is for modern advanced countries.
Humans are ‘hyper co-operators’ capable of living within massive groupings. Part of this is sheer common sense and the other greed. Large groups offer more opportunities and greater wealth.
Both greedy and visionary people work to create larger groupings, The greedy because the more people the greater chances for wealth, the visionaries because there are huge economies of scale and less conflict.
For every force splitting a State apart there are counter forces pulling it together. Plus there is history and collective experience. Small groups (unless they are as smart and tough as the Finns) get swallowed up or exploited by larger groups. Only under a Hyper State (such as the EU) can small States exist and prosper.
Example: All developed countries (excluding the US) have advanced and universal health systems. Governments rise and fall over how well these work. Imagine a sub-group trying to break away. Unless they can deliver an equivalent health system the majority of people (especially the middle classes) will not support them. In reality the existing State, with full support, will buy off, deal with or eliminate the secessionists.
Only if the middle classes are lost is there a chance for a State break up, but what is more often likely is that someone else will come along and appeal to them and rebuild a new State on the bones of the old one.
Going back to the original point, you want to hold States together … build a decent health system and a strong legal system and market. When people have something to lose their capacity to fight for break up will reduce. When you have a potential 70+ years of healthy life suddenly the prospect of dying young in a fight loses its appeal (plus the women vote with their fertility, only in fiction do they choose warriors over rich people).
This really is a no-brainer in many ways, why do advanced countries have so much trouble recruiting soldiers? Because the alternatives are so much better.
Comment by oldskeptic — 9 December 2007 @ 11:49 am