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	<title>Comments on: Three blind men examine the Iraq Elephant</title>
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	<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/</link>
	<description>A discussion of geopolitics, broadly defined, from an American's perspective.</description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2008 04:57:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: zoagria</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-872</link>
		<dc:creator>zoagria</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 10 Feb 2008 01:24:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-872</guid>
		<description>Here's another &lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080208/NATION04/795782028" rel="nofollow"&gt;link&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; for everyone's consideration.  The basic fact is that the armed forces had no reason to foresee such a complete breakdown or fubar on the part of civilian bureaucrats, and have been slammed unfairly for not being able to quickly learn skills that they had been assured would be handled by others.  

"A State Department official this week issued a blistering critique of Foreign Service bureaucrats at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for undermining civilian stability efforts in Iraq...."

For what it's worth, I and all my partners have undertaken this kind of projects in much more corrupt Countries than Iraq in order to establish audit metrics and were able to conclude projects that conformed to the guidelines set forth by the Administration and General Powell (whom I greatly admire).  So the task is not impossible, nor is controlling nor managing the development zones impossible.  Just not via the DoS.

Without a dramatic and serious change, the seven (of nine) development zones that are failing will continue to foster local resentments and feuds.  And in my opinion it's just not fair to expect the military to learn how to deal with this scale of reconstruction while the civilian bureaucrats, wonks, and war profiteers suck up all the allocated funding whist leaving nothing to show for it except more insurgents and chaos.  (I've already volunteered, but doubt they'll unleash my team on those poor foreign service hacks.)

A. Scott Crawford</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here&#8217;s another <strong><a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080208/NATION04/795782028" rel="nofollow">link</a></strong> for everyone&#8217;s consideration.  The basic fact is that the armed forces had no reason to foresee such a complete breakdown or fubar on the part of civilian bureaucrats, and have been slammed unfairly for not being able to quickly learn skills that they had been assured would be handled by others.  </p>
<p>&#8220;A State Department official this week issued a blistering critique of Foreign Service bureaucrats at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for undermining civilian stability efforts in Iraq&#8230;.&#8221;</p>
<p>For what it&#8217;s worth, I and all my partners have undertaken this kind of projects in much more corrupt Countries than Iraq in order to establish audit metrics and were able to conclude projects that conformed to the guidelines set forth by the Administration and General Powell (whom I greatly admire).  So the task is not impossible, nor is controlling nor managing the development zones impossible.  Just not via the DoS.</p>
<p>Without a dramatic and serious change, the seven (of nine) development zones that are failing will continue to foster local resentments and feuds.  And in my opinion it&#8217;s just not fair to expect the military to learn how to deal with this scale of reconstruction while the civilian bureaucrats, wonks, and war profiteers suck up all the allocated funding whist leaving nothing to show for it except more insurgents and chaos.  (I&#8217;ve already volunteered, but doubt they&#8217;ll unleash my team on those poor foreign service hacks.)</p>
<p>A. Scott Crawford</p>
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		<title>By: Fabius Maximus</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-830</link>
		<dc:creator>Fabius Maximus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2008 03:10:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-830</guid>
		<description>Oldskeptic -- my feelings exactly.  As they said in WWII: "In the we do precision bombing of area targets, at night we do area bombing of precision targets."  What a farce, bombing dense urban areas with high explosive to kill insurgents.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oldskeptic &#8212; my feelings exactly.  As they said in WWII: &#8220;In the we do precision bombing of area targets, at night we do area bombing of precision targets.&#8221;  What a farce, bombing dense urban areas with high explosive to kill insurgents.</p>
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		<title>By: OldSkeptic</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-824</link>
		<dc:creator>OldSkeptic</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Feb 2008 21:32:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-824</guid>
		<description>Good article in Asia Times on Afghanistan (which is using similar tactics, with similar sucess) about the limited US resources spent on non-combat operations: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JB08Df04.html

Personally, when I read about "20 insurgents killed by a precision bomb" I automatically mentally translate that into "1 insurgent killed by bomb, 19 civilians killed by bomb, 5 new insurgents created".  Thats when I'm in an optimistic mood. When I feel pessimistic, I take out the one insurgent killed.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good article in Asia Times on Afghanistan (which is using similar tactics, with similar sucess) about the limited US resources spent on non-combat operations: <a href="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JB08Df04.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JB08Df04.html</a></p>
<p>Personally, when I read about &#8220;20 insurgents killed by a precision bomb&#8221; I automatically mentally translate that into &#8220;1 insurgent killed by bomb, 19 civilians killed by bomb, 5 new insurgents created&#8221;.  Thats when I&#8217;m in an optimistic mood. When I feel pessimistic, I take out the one insurgent killed.</p>
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		<title>By: Fabius Maximus</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-809</link>
		<dc:creator>Fabius Maximus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Feb 2008 02:38:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-809</guid>
		<description>"The problem with using air-power is neither the killing of insurgents, nor of bystanders - both are very useful. Terror works."

Perhaps.  But the few times actual attempts at analysis of air power's impact have been made by non-AF advocates, they data has not shown this.  Going way back to the Strategic Bombing survey after WWII.

Certainly the dismal record of developed nation interventions in 3rd world insurgencies since WWII -- in which air power has usually played a large part -- shows no clear victories and a few maybes (e.g., Malaysia, where the credit goes to the Brits or locals -- depending on the chronicler).

I strongly agree with your reasoning about events in Iraq.  Note &lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/iraq-goals/" rel="nofollow"&gt;this&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; listing the various statements of our goals and benchmarks in Iraq.  Not much visible progress toward these, despite the vast sums America has borrowed and spent there.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;The problem with using air-power is neither the killing of insurgents, nor of bystanders - both are very useful. Terror works.&#8221;</p>
<p>Perhaps.  But the few times actual attempts at analysis of air power&#8217;s impact have been made by non-AF advocates, they data has not shown this.  Going way back to the Strategic Bombing survey after WWII.</p>
<p>Certainly the dismal record of developed nation interventions in 3rd world insurgencies since WWII &#8212; in which air power has usually played a large part &#8212; shows no clear victories and a few maybes (e.g., Malaysia, where the credit goes to the Brits or locals &#8212; depending on the chronicler).</p>
<p>I strongly agree with your reasoning about events in Iraq.  Note <strong><a href="http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/iraq-goals/" rel="nofollow">this</a></strong> listing the various statements of our goals and benchmarks in Iraq.  Not much visible progress toward these, despite the vast sums America has borrowed and spent there.</p>
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		<title>By: baduin</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-803</link>
		<dc:creator>baduin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 22:01:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-803</guid>
		<description>The problem with using air-power is neither the killing of insurgents, nor of bystanders - both are very useful. Terror works.

The problem is that when you bomb you don't get prisoners and intelligence. And that intelligence is what counts. The hired terrorists are largely unimportant. It is even worse when your information comes from some local faction - Zeus throwing his thunderbolts from on high can be duped quite easily.

As regards "the Surge" everything I hear confirms my original opinion. White House was so remote from the reality that it was unable to command its own troops in Iraq. As the result, the soldiers took matters in their own hands and created "Awakenings" etc.

There is only one problem with it. The military victory was achieved in 2003. Now we should be speaking about a political victory. Such a victory could be defined as the political situation favourable to America. What America needs in Iraq is a strong, but not too strong state which can oppose Iran and pump oil. It does not have to be said that this state should be friendly to America. 

How near are Americans to such a victory? Farther than ever. The middle class, necessary for any even partially modern state, ran away. Petraeus abandoned the Iraqi state, which is controlled by Shia, and began supporting Sunni militias.  This means abandoning the original purpose for which American army was occupying Iraq, after it became apparent that there are no nuclear weapons there. 

That purpose - the democratisation of Iraq - was stupid and impossible to achieve. But now there is NO political objective at all. The Army and Petraeus are  making do with short-term solutions. It is impossible to say whether they are helping or hindering the policy - since that policy doesn't exists. Army cannot generate it on their own, neither legally not intellectually.

American Army now serves to keep the lid on the situation and stop Iran from any adventures. This situation could continue forever, were it not for one problem - keeping the American Army in Iraq costs a lot. At some point, it will have to return home. And then what?  At present, it seems that Iraq will fall into pieces, and the government will lose any ability to influence the situation. The civil war will restart, with newly created Sunni militias opposing Shias.

Concluding - the real war in Iraq have not even started. All parties are waiting in the starting block for the race to begin.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The problem with using air-power is neither the killing of insurgents, nor of bystanders - both are very useful. Terror works.</p>
<p>The problem is that when you bomb you don&#8217;t get prisoners and intelligence. And that intelligence is what counts. The hired terrorists are largely unimportant. It is even worse when your information comes from some local faction - Zeus throwing his thunderbolts from on high can be duped quite easily.</p>
<p>As regards &#8220;the Surge&#8221; everything I hear confirms my original opinion. White House was so remote from the reality that it was unable to command its own troops in Iraq. As the result, the soldiers took matters in their own hands and created &#8220;Awakenings&#8221; etc.</p>
<p>There is only one problem with it. The military victory was achieved in 2003. Now we should be speaking about a political victory. Such a victory could be defined as the political situation favourable to America. What America needs in Iraq is a strong, but not too strong state which can oppose Iran and pump oil. It does not have to be said that this state should be friendly to America. </p>
<p>How near are Americans to such a victory? Farther than ever. The middle class, necessary for any even partially modern state, ran away. Petraeus abandoned the Iraqi state, which is controlled by Shia, and began supporting Sunni militias.  This means abandoning the original purpose for which American army was occupying Iraq, after it became apparent that there are no nuclear weapons there. </p>
<p>That purpose - the democratisation of Iraq - was stupid and impossible to achieve. But now there is NO political objective at all. The Army and Petraeus are  making do with short-term solutions. It is impossible to say whether they are helping or hindering the policy - since that policy doesn&#8217;t exists. Army cannot generate it on their own, neither legally not intellectually.</p>
<p>American Army now serves to keep the lid on the situation and stop Iran from any adventures. This situation could continue forever, were it not for one problem - keeping the American Army in Iraq costs a lot. At some point, it will have to return home. And then what?  At present, it seems that Iraq will fall into pieces, and the government will lose any ability to influence the situation. The civil war will restart, with newly created Sunni militias opposing Shias.</p>
<p>Concluding - the real war in Iraq have not even started. All parties are waiting in the starting block for the race to begin.</p>
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		<title>By: maximilliangc</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-802</link>
		<dc:creator>maximilliangc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 19:46:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-802</guid>
		<description>I concour,  the use of airpower in these dense urban and civilian populated regions is counter-productive to the longer term stratgic goal of "winning hearts and minds."  As someone else mentioned Creveld does a masterfull job of explaining.  

Large scale aireal bombardment that Chet refered to,  of the Ho-Chi-Mihn trail in Vietnam was charcterised by those with a critical eye as to be "Killing Flys with a slegde hammer."  With literally hundereds, if not thousands of tons expended, to kill even a single Vietcong "insurgent."  

How much physical property damage is inflicted , and how many bystanders,  neutrals,  even partisans who might be swayed to our side,  if given a chance,   compared to confirmed bad guys get killed in these tactical airstrikes in Iraq ?  The truth probably being,  that airpower has little, or no place at all in this variety of 4G conflict, but the USAF, &#38; USN both have a whole lot to try and prove in this scenario,  in oder to justify thier position and lest God Forbid,  thier funding diminish in favour of land forces.

And that is a sad situation, and underscores one variation of the myriad low intensity 4GW,  ongoing in the United States itself.  Before the US can ever hope to win at 4gw elsewhere,  it needs to get it's own situation fully undercontrol.  Not much hope of that ever happening,,,.   MaXimillian</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I concour,  the use of airpower in these dense urban and civilian populated regions is counter-productive to the longer term stratgic goal of &#8220;winning hearts and minds.&#8221;  As someone else mentioned Creveld does a masterfull job of explaining.  </p>
<p>Large scale aireal bombardment that Chet refered to,  of the Ho-Chi-Mihn trail in Vietnam was charcterised by those with a critical eye as to be &#8220;Killing Flys with a slegde hammer.&#8221;  With literally hundereds, if not thousands of tons expended, to kill even a single Vietcong &#8220;insurgent.&#8221;  </p>
<p>How much physical property damage is inflicted , and how many bystanders,  neutrals,  even partisans who might be swayed to our side,  if given a chance,   compared to confirmed bad guys get killed in these tactical airstrikes in Iraq ?  The truth probably being,  that airpower has little, or no place at all in this variety of 4G conflict, but the USAF, &amp; USN both have a whole lot to try and prove in this scenario,  in oder to justify thier position and lest God Forbid,  thier funding diminish in favour of land forces.</p>
<p>And that is a sad situation, and underscores one variation of the myriad low intensity 4GW,  ongoing in the United States itself.  Before the US can ever hope to win at 4gw elsewhere,  it needs to get it&#8217;s own situation fully undercontrol.  Not much hope of that ever happening,,,.   MaXimillian</p>
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		<title>By: dckinder</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-800</link>
		<dc:creator>dckinder</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 15:58:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-800</guid>
		<description>&lt;a href="http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=675" rel="nofollow"&gt;Winston Churchill chronicled the demoralizing effects of using technology to defeat men at Omdurman&lt;/a&gt;:

&lt;i&gt;Three days before I had seen them rise — eager, confident, resolved. The roar of their shouting had swelled like the surf on a rocky shore. The flashing of their blades had displayed their numbers, their vitality, their ferocity. They were confident in their strength, in the justice of their cause, in the support of their religion. Now only the heaps of corruption in the plain, and the fugitives dispersed and scattered in the wilderness, remained. The terrible machinery of scientific war had done its work. The Dervish host was scattered and destroyed. Their end, however, only anticipates that of the victors; for Time, which laughs at science, as science laughs at valour, will in due course contemptuously brush both combatants away.&lt;/i&gt;

If anything, using air power rather than gattling guns only aggravates this dehumanization.  It provokes outrage and contempt and those thereby vanguished will challenge it when they can.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=675" rel="nofollow">Winston Churchill chronicled the demoralizing effects of using technology to defeat men at Omdurman</a>:</p>
<p><i>Three days before I had seen them rise — eager, confident, resolved. The roar of their shouting had swelled like the surf on a rocky shore. The flashing of their blades had displayed their numbers, their vitality, their ferocity. They were confident in their strength, in the justice of their cause, in the support of their religion. Now only the heaps of corruption in the plain, and the fugitives dispersed and scattered in the wilderness, remained. The terrible machinery of scientific war had done its work. The Dervish host was scattered and destroyed. Their end, however, only anticipates that of the victors; for Time, which laughs at science, as science laughs at valour, will in due course contemptuously brush both combatants away.</i></p>
<p>If anything, using air power rather than gattling guns only aggravates this dehumanization.  It provokes outrage and contempt and those thereby vanguished will challenge it when they can.</p>
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		<title>By: Fabius Maximus</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-799</link>
		<dc:creator>Fabius Maximus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 13:43:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-799</guid>
		<description>With pictures we could better understand the nature and effect of US bombing in Iraq.  Neither DoD (understandably) or the US media provide pics, so we must guess -- or watch  &lt;a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/55ABE840-AC30-41D2-BDC9-06BBE2A36665.htm" rel="nofollow"&gt;Al Jazeera&lt;/a&gt;.  That is something to think about when advocates tell us that US media coverage is strongly slanted against the war.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With pictures we could better understand the nature and effect of US bombing in Iraq.  Neither DoD (understandably) or the US media provide pics, so we must guess &#8212; or watch  <a href="http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/55ABE840-AC30-41D2-BDC9-06BBE2A36665.htm" rel="nofollow">Al Jazeera</a>.  That is something to think about when advocates tell us that US media coverage is strongly slanted against the war.</p>
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		<title>By: Fabius Maximus</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-798</link>
		<dc:creator>Fabius Maximus</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 13:34:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-798</guid>
		<description>Note that our operations, both ground and (more often) air, frequently appear to be punitive in intent.  This was also common in Vietnam.  As one of countless examples, here is an excerpt from an “Iraq Update" from Stratfor (15 November 2006):

&lt;em&gt;"For its part, the US is pressuring the Iraqi government to disassemble the militias -- and to install Cabinet members who will further this goal. To this end, U.S. forces launched two raids into areas dominated by Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr on Nov. 11 and Nov. 13.  The second raid -- in Shula, a neighborhood controlled al-Sadr's Mehdi Army -- was large enough to demonstrate the full power of a coordinated U.S. push backed by armor and aircraft.  The fact that this raid did not target Sadr City, al-Sadr's center of power, likely means the strike was not intended to seriously damage the Mehdi Army. However, it did prove that the US is still a formidable force in Iraq..."&lt;/em&gt;
 
This describes a raid, sending troops to kill and destroy civilian "targets" in hope of influencing their leaders to fear and obey us.  I doubt any expert on Iraq believes that the Iraq Government, as currently configured, can disassemble the militias – or that such strikes advance any rational goal.

Note the DoD definition of terrorism (from JP 1-02):
"The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate overnments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological."

We can take cover beyond the modifier "lawful", although that has little meaning in Iraq - where both our militiary and our mercs operate without the supervision (and often against the wishes) of the local government.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Note that our operations, both ground and (more often) air, frequently appear to be punitive in intent.  This was also common in Vietnam.  As one of countless examples, here is an excerpt from an “Iraq Update&#8221; from Stratfor (15 November 2006):</p>
<p><em>&#8220;For its part, the US is pressuring the Iraqi government to disassemble the militias &#8212; and to install Cabinet members who will further this goal. To this end, U.S. forces launched two raids into areas dominated by Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr on Nov. 11 and Nov. 13.  The second raid &#8212; in Shula, a neighborhood controlled al-Sadr&#8217;s Mehdi Army &#8212; was large enough to demonstrate the full power of a coordinated U.S. push backed by armor and aircraft.  The fact that this raid did not target Sadr City, al-Sadr&#8217;s center of power, likely means the strike was not intended to seriously damage the Mehdi Army. However, it did prove that the US is still a formidable force in Iraq&#8230;&#8221;</em></p>
<p>This describes a raid, sending troops to kill and destroy civilian &#8220;targets&#8221; in hope of influencing their leaders to fear and obey us.  I doubt any expert on Iraq believes that the Iraq Government, as currently configured, can disassemble the militias – or that such strikes advance any rational goal.</p>
<p>Note the DoD definition of terrorism (from JP 1-02):<br />
&#8220;The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate overnments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.&#8221;</p>
<p>We can take cover beyond the modifier &#8220;lawful&#8221;, although that has little meaning in Iraq - where both our militiary and our mercs operate without the supervision (and often against the wishes) of the local government.</p>
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		<title>By: Chet</title>
		<link>http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/02/06/three-blind-men/#comment-795</link>
		<dc:creator>Chet</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 11:03:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/?p=133#comment-795</guid>
		<description>Before anyone gets upset about the "massed bombings" phrase, I don't know of any use of anything resembling the Arc Light sorties flown by strategic bombers in Vietnam.  I'm just drawing a parallel in mindsets between the two conflicts.

What I'm alluding to is the practice of using airpower as the destructive device to destroy the enemy.  This is entirely appropriate in maneuver or attrition warfare, where the enemy is another military combatant.  But even when conducted with precision weapons, mistakes in identification will be made, particularly in densely populated civilian areas, and it's impossible to completely avoid collateral damage to the population.

I totally empathize with our forces on the ground who have to deal with a confused and highly dangerous situation.  What the world sees, however, as in Vietnam, is the US using high-tech, stand-off weaponry to engage light infantry mixed in with the civilian population - van Creveld's strong fighting the weak.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Before anyone gets upset about the &#8220;massed bombings&#8221; phrase, I don&#8217;t know of any use of anything resembling the Arc Light sorties flown by strategic bombers in Vietnam.  I&#8217;m just drawing a parallel in mindsets between the two conflicts.</p>
<p>What I&#8217;m alluding to is the practice of using airpower as the destructive device to destroy the enemy.  This is entirely appropriate in maneuver or attrition warfare, where the enemy is another military combatant.  But even when conducted with precision weapons, mistakes in identification will be made, particularly in densely populated civilian areas, and it&#8217;s impossible to completely avoid collateral damage to the population.</p>
<p>I totally empathize with our forces on the ground who have to deal with a confused and highly dangerous situation.  What the world sees, however, as in Vietnam, is the US using high-tech, stand-off weaponry to engage light infantry mixed in with the civilian population - van Creveld&#8217;s strong fighting the weak.</p>
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