“Hoping to turn enemies into allies, U.S. forces are arming Iraqis who fought with the insurgents. But it’s already starting to backfire. A report from the front lines of the new Iraq.”

Also worth reading is John Robb’s new analysis “Adrift” (25 February 2008).

Glad to see we havn’t lost our acute sardonic sense of humour around here,,,,. maX

I suspect that the “best” outcome available to the U.S. at this point is a soft partition, with a nominally soverign government in Baghdad within the Iranian sphere of influence. The problems I see with even this are:

1. None of the neighbors are going to be happy with a functionally independant “Kurdistan”, which as you point out, isn’t exactly internally stable, either. While I doubt that any of these neighbors will physically invade, the past five years have shown the many ays you can find proxies within Iraq to carry your water if you want to make trouble there. And possibly only Syria (as the weakest and poorest) has any motive to make access deal with the Kurds, an issue for a landlocked country.

2 The “mixed” provinces and Baghdad provide lots of potential for continued friction in the form of ethnic cleansing and factional fighting. In essence, Mr. Bush’s crusade has functioned to move the Arab-Persian border several hundred miles south and west. Both factions and their sponsors (Saudis and other Arab states in Anbar and the Sunni-element mixed states like Diyala; Iran for the “federal government” and SIIC/Badr) will continue to vie for power.

3. As noted above, the victory hymns are all about the IA/IP. Civil government in Iraq is a bad joke now and has been since the corruptionpalooza Bremer years. A semi-failed state with a strong Army as the only working institution? Can you say “military dictatorship”, boys and girls? I expect a caudillo in Baghdad within a decade. The only question at that point is will this Shiite Somoza be working hand in glove with the CIA, or with the Iranians (or playing us off against each other) and what will happen if, like many of the breed, he gets a dream of “reuniting” Iraq and invades the north, or attacks the Sunni CLC/militia areas.

For this mess we needed a Machiavelli or a Tallyrand and instead we had Dougie Feith and a troupe of GOP circus monkeys. Sweet baby Jesus!

“…The primary American interest in Iraq at this point is a negative one — namely, that Iraq not become an Iranian satellite…”
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Fabius Maximus replies: This is interesting. It would be more interesting if Friedman had a decent record of forecasting in Iraq. Or if there was actual evidence that Iraq might become an Iranian satellite. I doubt the Kurds will. I very much doubt the Sunni Arabs will. One of — perhaps the most — popular and powerful Shiite Arab leaders is very much opposed to Iraq becoming an Iranian satellite.

But they are not alone. They border Iran and Turkey, and both those states have important reasons to intervene. Without a strong state they will not be able to defend themselves. Does a strong state require a dictator? Obviously not. But you cannot have a state without a strong center of authority. A bunch of tribes barely able to tolerate each other won’t be able to create an army strong enough to balance Iran. Therefore, Americans got to stay.

What is worrying me is that Americans seem to be following an Iranian script. Iran needs now Americans in Iraq - they need “hostages” so they won’t get bombed. A low level infiltration etc keeps things on the boil without provoking anything dangerous for the Mullahs.

When they get their nuke, they will want America to leave, so they can go grab as much oil as possible. Fortunately, by that time America will be out of money and American public will be tired of the whole expedition.

Yes. Sumerian city states, from 2900 to 1800 BC.
http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/MESO/SUMER.HTM

Here is a short timeline of Iraq’s history. I suggest to anyone thinking that Iraq can survive without a strong central authority to try to find a period, AFTER Sumerians, where this happened.

http://historymedren.about.com/library/text/bltxtiraqmain.htm
http://www.al-bab.com/Arab/countries/iraq/history.htm

See also:
“Iraq’s Culture of Violence“, Shafeeq N. Ghabra, Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2001)
“Culture in Post-Saddam Iraq“, Nimrod Raphaeli, Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2007)
“Correspondence: How Violent Is Iraqi Culture?”, Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2008)
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Fabius Maximus replies: powerful evidence. Perhaps you are right.

So there may well be another hegemon in Baghdad, but there’s little sign that the Iraqis are looking to us to fill that role.

But it will not be able to stay much longer - the cost is becoming too great. Either America will manage to occupy Iraq much cheaper (a Foreign Legion?), to construct a unified state (unified enough to keep a viable army) or Iraq will become the arena of conflict between Kurds, Turkey, Iran etc.
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Fabius Maximus replies, re: need for a hegemon. How do you know this? These folks have lived together, often peacefully, for millenia.