What I do take exception to is a statement like this: “…the long and expensive futility of the Iraq War results from the long decay of our intelligence apparatus.”

Yes, intelligence analysis about Iraq was flawed, but I think there’s ample documentation of a runaway circle of policymakers who neither wanted nor needed much good intelligence to support their decision to invade. And Paul Pilar can bitch-slap anyone he pleases in the pages of Foreign Affairs, but the fact is that none of our vaunted mideast specialists in the IC said much to warn those policy hawks that removing the hard hand of Saddam Hussein might unleash long-dormant ethnic tensions. And let’s not even get into the issue of the nonexistent links between Saddam and al-Q, which the IC attempted (futiley) to dispel. From top to bottom, this was a policy disaster. Intelligence played its supporting role, dutifully, but we all know who was in the spotlight.
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Fabius Maximus: yes, there is more than enough blame for everybody in this multi-faceted wreck! That is typical, fo course. Consider the Titanic as the model of a systems failure. Many things had to go wrong to produce such a complete disaster.

First he trots out the standard CIA defense - just like it was new: “In the intelligence business, failures (and apparent contradictions) make headlines, while successes generally remain secret.” Every critic of the CIA for decades has rebutted this at length. To trot out this old chestnut suggests that he is not serious, but only going through the motions.

“Second, calling for intelligence reform serves psychological and political purposes that have nothing to do with the intelligence agencies’ successes or failures.” Now that is a powerful defense, like “Yes I burgled his house, but his accusation of me seves psychological purposes…”

Even more profound: “Finally, intelligence failures are inevitable.” I think we all know that, Professor. It is the CIA’s batting average that worries us.

Among the nonsense in this review, one line pretty much says all we need to know of Prof Pillar’s thinking: “However, this explanation overlooks the strong bias toward reform among managers inside the intelligence community. Like ambitious managers anywhere, they make their careers not by sitting on the status quo but by championing new initiatives and strategic redirections.” Yep, the US government apparatus has such a strong bias toward reform! Is he a fool, or does he just think we are?