Successful info ops, but who are the targets?

 This looks like good news:

U.S., Allies See Progress in Selling Al-Qaeda As an Enemy to the Muslim World“, Walter Pincus, Washington Post  (28 April 2008) — Excerpt:

“More and more Muslim and Arab populations — [including] clerics and scholars — are questioning the value of al-Qaeda’s program,” Juan Carlos Zarate, deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism, said Wednesday at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Or, it might be bad news:

“Using Info Operations to Defeat AQ“, Marc Lynch, posted at Abu Aardvark (29 April 2008) — Excerpt:

Thanks to Matt Armstrong for tipping me off to the online proceedings of the 2008 Unrestricted Warfare Symposiumat Johns Hopkins, which includes an interesting set of briefing slides by Col. Karen Lloyd of J3, Joint IO Warfare Center.   The interesting part of her presentation was what appears, from the slides, to be some frank discussion of what the US is currently doing in the information operations arena against al-Qaeda, including from Slide 6 …

… Now, compare this to an April 23 speech at the Washington Institute by deputy national security advisor for combatting terrorism Juan Zarate called “Winning the War on Terror,” which offered four examples of the “growing rejection of the al-Qaida program and message”:
 
These examples offered by a senior American official to an American audience in support of the claim that “al-Qaeda is losing” (persuasive enough to merit a story in the Washington Post) mirror, nearly point for point, the examples presented by Col. Lloyd of successful US information operations aimed at defeating al-Qaeda.

Who was right about Basra — experts or war bloggers?

Here is the first follow-up to the my series of posts about the fighting in Basra, a test of credibility — matching the reporting from Iraq by some war bloggers against the analysis of area experts at home.  There are two sets of mainstream media articles displayed below. 

1. Articles by two major publications that in effect say the war bloggers were correct.  These deserve close attention.
2. Current news about important developments since the fighting.

It is too soon to draw conclusions, but not too soon to start keeping score.

The first group — major media adopting the victory narrative?

Mosul is just like Chicago!

The Instapundit keeps America informed about events in Iraq:

“CHICAGO SOUNDS LIKE MOSUL:” That’s an email from . . . Michael Yon, who knows his Mosul. Here’s the story on last weekend’s violence {in Chicago}.

Still, they’re different: One has crooked officials, violent gangs with their hooks into government and law enforcement, and a culture of corruption that has resisted the central government’s effects to clean it up, and the other is a city in Iraq.

To test this astounding theory, please review a few news stories from Mosul.  I randomly selected from Juan Cole’s Informed Comment (links go to the actual news report).  This is not a complete record, as I gave up after a half hour.

The Internet can make us smarter — or dumber.  The result of the tool depends on the user.  If we seek only evidence that confirms our opinions, we will be stupid — no matter what 21st century technology we use.  At the end of this post are links to other articles in this series about the two different views of Iraq that Americans see in their news media.

FYI:  Michael Yon has a new book out:  Moment of Truth in Iraq.

Update: 

Was this a joke?  Probably.  But it fits in the narrative of increasing security in Iraq, which has been overstated often in recent months.  A quick Google search suggests that this comparison was taken seriously by many (examples here and here), which should be no surprise given the intense propaganda campaign during the past year for the “victory narrative.”  Violence in much of Iraq continues at horrific levels, and much of the commentary about Iraq does not well reflect this.  In my opinion, violence at this level — continuing for so many years, with no end in sight — is not a fit subject for humor.  Tears, yes.  Jokes, no.

News stories about violence in Mosul

“Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq, Thursday 17 January 2008“, McClatchy

Two views of Fallujah - which tells us more about the future?

One consistent oddity of the Iraq War is that we read two streams of reports about it, so different that they might be of different wars.  Here are two such.  One from a mainstream media source.  One from Michael Totten, one of the best-known war-bloggers.  Both are balanced, Totten’s especially so, but they give us alternative perspectives.  Which tells us about the future of Iraq and our war?

“Hope for Iraq’s Meanest City“, Michael J. Totten (13 April 2008), also published in City Journal – Except:

The insurgency arose in Fallujah before spreading to the rest of the country. Perhaps it is fitting, then, that the insurgents—now on the run elsewhere in Iraq—were first beaten here in the City of Mosques.

… When American soldiers and Marines abandoned Fallujahin the early days of the war, it wasn’t ready to stand on its own. They are more certain now that their work is nearly finished. Almost all the Army soldiers have left, and only two jobs remain for the Marines: repairing the city; and preparing the local authorities to stand on their own. Most of the effort goes into training the Iraqi police.

… Fallujah’s worst days are likely behind it. “The al-Qaida leadership outside dumped huge amounts of money and people and arms into Anbar Province,” says Lieutenant Colonel Mike Silverman, who oversees an area just north of Ramadi. “They poured everything they had into this place. The battle against Americans in Anbar became their most important fight in the world. And they lost.”

“Five Years On, Fallujah in Tatters“, Ali al-Fadhily and Dahr Jamail, Inter Press Service, 14 April 2008 — Except:

Fallujah remains a crippled city more than two years after the November 2004 U.S.-led assault.  Unemployment, and lack of medical care and safe drinking water in the city 60 km west of Baghdad remain a continuous problem. Freedom of movement is still curtailed.

 Totten paints a picture of life in Fallujah.

Fantasy sells so much better than news!

How does one become a super-node on the Internet?  Newspaper editors believe “if it bleeds, it leads.”  Taking an opposite approach, the Instapundit has found that a steady diet of good news can attract a large audience.  (Note:  he also tells readers not to rely on him as their only source of information)

Rising food costs have made biofuels controversial.  The Instapundit refers us to an exciting story with this:

BIOFUELS VS. FOOD SUPPLIES: The debate continues: “More to the point, though, is the mistaken notion that we have to use food crops for fuel production. In test fields in Minnesota, Tilman and his colleagues have found that the best energy yields actually come from native prairie grasses, not corn or soy.” 

The story is as exciting as he bills it. ”Scientists weigh in on biofuels vs. food debate“, Popsci.com (16 April 2008) — Excerpt”

With debate raging on whether biofuels are robbing the world’s hungry of food, scientists and engineers at the first annual BioMass conference in Minneapolis say it ain’t so.

The Internet makes us dumber: the Bakken euphoria, a case study

Summary:  A case study of information flow on the Internet, and some conclusions.  Why does the Internet sometimes make us dumber?  How can we use it better?  We will need all the help we can get in the days to come.

The Internet can make us smarter — or dumber.  It depends on how we use it.  This post examines the euphoria over the Bakken Formation, and how it grew, briefly flowered, and died.  It is a case study, showing the flows through the Internet of information and misinformation.

I.  We start at the beginning.  This paper sparked new interest in the potential oil output of this area:  “Origins and Characteristics of the Basin-Centered Continuous Reservoir Unconventional Oil-Resource Base of the Bakken Source System, Williston Basin”, Leigh Price (1999/2000) — Price estimated the Bakken formation may hold as many as 900 billion barrels of oil. He died in August 2000; the study was never published by the USGS.   Here is a link to the paper. 

Price’s paper was both technical and obscure.  For anyone wanting facts about this topic, the North Dakota state website provides a clear statement of the facts: Bakken Formation Reserve Estimates.

As interest in the Bakken formation grew, with drilling of several successful low-output wells, more reports appeared on the Internet. 

Euphoria about the Bakken Formation

Summary:  The euphoria about this is nonsense.  The Bakken Formation was discovered in 1953; production started in 2000.  The USGS report will discuss the recoverable resources, which are important.  But the key questions concern the maximum flows produced and the cost of production — which answer make this just another unconventional source, of marginal significance in the peak oil calculations.

As usual, the internet can make us dumber or smarter — depending on how we use it.

1. Example of good reporting:  “Report on Bakken oil potential expected“, Business Week (7 April 2008)
2. Clear statement of the issues from the North Dakota state website: Bakken Formation Reserve Estimates.
3. The paper that started the discussion:  “Origins and Characteristics of the Basin-Centered Continuous Reservoir Unconventional Oil-Resource Base of the Bakken Source System, Williston Basin”, Leigh Price (1999/2000) — Price estimated the Bakken formation may hold as many as 900 billion barrels of oil. He died in 2000; the study was never peer reviewed or published.   Here is a link to the paper.
4. Example of nonsense:  “North Dakota Discovery - 200 Bn Bbl of Oil“, Classical Values (April 2008) - “Here is a technique for Mining Oil. I think the peak oil folks got it wrong. As usual. Capitalism beats the fear mongers. Again.”
5. Update:  The USGS pricked the balloon.  For a retrospective see The Internet makes us dumber: the Bakken euphoria, a case study.

Bill Roggio comments on this series about “war bloggers”

Here is a comment from Bill Roggio about these posts about war bloggers, posted with his permission.

The series you have run here is valuable. I am very interested in seeing how this plays out. I certainly appreciate both the tone and nature of your postings, and your willingness to have a civil and productive discussion. We need more of this kind of debate and analysis, and less of the uncivil “debates” - if you can call them that - that exist throughout much of the Internet. My sincerest thanks.

Some comments by Bill Roggio, Editor of the Long War Journal

Bill Roggio, Editor of the Long War Journal, generously replied to my posts about his recent reports concerning events in Basra. See his bio here.

Comment #1

I certainly appreciate the attention you’ve given me for the Basrah reporting. I do think you are drawing the wrong conclusions to my reports.

I am surprised you can say my reporting brims with “certainty and simplicity” and then call the mainstream reports “tentative.” Go reread them, and ask yourself who is declaring a winner and a loser? Is that not the definition of “certainty and simplicity”, to claim to know who won and who lost? I have done no such thing — I have never said the government or Sadr has won. I challenge you to find a statement from me that said I believed the Iraqi government was victorious. You are assuming this from reading the reports. But you would be wrong to think that I declared a winner or loser.

Sources of the Instapundit’s knowledge about Iraq — analysis or cartoons?

War bloggers are the foundation of one chain providing information and analysis of the Iraq War to American citizens. The previous posts in this series provided evidence indicating that their view often tends to be both skewed and inaccurate. This post looks at websites higher in this chain, again using the recent events in Basra as a test case to evaluate their accuracy.

For example, see The Instapundit– one of the most influential American bloggers — who has consistently focused on reporting of the war bloggers instead of actual experts on Middle Eastern affairs (e.g., note his many references to Michael Totten’s reports about Iraq during 2003 - 2005). This is, of course, and exception to the careful selection of sources that built his impressive reputation — seen, for example, in his linking on legal issues.

Today the Instapundit refers his readers to Austin Bay (Colonel, US Army Reserve, retired) for analysis of the Basra fighting. Here are links to his bio, published books and blog.

“Whittling Away at Sadr“, Austin Bay (2 April 2008) - (here is the original source for his syndicated columns) Excerpt:

After his outlaw militiamen raised white flags and skedaddled from their latest round of combat with the Iraqi Army, radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr declared victory.

He always does. He understands media bravado. He wagers that survival bandaged by bombast and swathed in sensational headlines is a short-term triumph. Survive long enough, and Sadr bets he will prevail.

Experts’ views about the recent fighting in Basra

(#9 in a series)   The recent events in Basra provide a test, allowing comparison of a war blogger’s analysis vs. that of experts.  The previous post showed Bill Roggio’s view of the Basra fighting (as a sample of war-bloggers’ reporting).  This post looks at both mainstream reporting and expert analysis.  In the next few days or weeks, when the dust settles, we will see whose analysis was most accurate. 

Note that expert analysis tends to be more tentative, with emphasis on the limits of the available data, and the complex, fluid nature of the situation.  War blogger reports tend (a broad generalization, not always correct) to display both certainty and simplicity (sometimes approaching cartoon-like).

“ANALYSIS-Iraqi crackdown backfires, strengthens Sadrists“, Reuters  (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:

Gareth Stansfield, a professor of Middle East politics at the University of Exeter in England, said Maliki had staked his political credibility on the show of force in Basra and lost.  “Maliki’s credibility is shot at this point. He really thought his security forces could really do this. But he’s failed,” he said.

“reports of a truce, some reflections“, Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark  (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:

Basra, a test case: war blogger’s vs. experts

(#9 in a series)  Current events in Basra provide a test case to compare the accuracy of the war bloggers vs. that of conventional experts.  This post shows of a prominent war blogger, Bill Roggio (Editor of the Long War Journal; see his bio here).  The following post looks at the views of several experts.

{Update}  I use Roggio’s work, like Totten’s in the earlier posts, as one of the best of the war bloggers.  Roggio’s analysis about Basra differs from the experts’ view in two ways.

•  LWJ describes the Basra fighting as a normal “government vs. militia” operation.  This contrasts with analysis by regional experts, who emphasize the political dimensions of these operations - an apparent attempt by Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to prevent losses in the next elections.
• LWJ describes the operations as a success, contrast with analysts’ reports that this - based on what little we know - appears to be at best a tie, and more likely a win for al Sadr.  See Marc Lynch’s reports here and here, and Chet Richard’s analysis here.

“Maliki: ‘Security operations in Basra will continue‘”, Bill Roggio, Editor of the Long War Journal (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:

One day after Muqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, called for his fighters to abandon combat, the fighting in Basrah has come to a near-halt, and the Iraqi security forces are patrolling the streets. While Sadr spokesman said the Iraqi government agreed to Sadr’s terms for the cease-fire, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki has said the security forces will continue operations in Basrah in the South. Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army took heavy casualties in Basrah, Nasiriyah, Babil, and Baghdad over the weekend, despite Sadr’s call for the end of fighting.

Evidence of the war bloggers’ growing influence

(#8 in a series)  One frequent response to my series on War Bloggers is that are a minor phenomenon, especially compared to the mainstream media.  First that ignores the increasing prominence of the war bloggers.  Second, this ignores their increasing role in the mainstream media - NY Times, Wall Street Journal, and now this — a glowing review in the influential Columbia Journalism Review.

Note:  I use “mil-blogs” in the narrow sense of “blogs by soldiers”, per Major Elizabeth Robbins (US Army) in “Muddy Boots 10:  the rise of Soldier blogs“, Military Review(September-October 2007).  The CJR article uses the term in a wider sense, what I call “war bloggers.”

“Blogging the Long War“, Columbia Journalism Review(March/April 2008) - “Bill Roggio wants to be your source for conflict coverage”

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, among the seven-hundred-odd journalists who embedded with combat units were few who were familiar with the military in any intimate way. To many critics, especially those with military experience, this revealed itself in the press’s coverage of the war, which they felt often missed the mark when it came to explaining the hows and the whys of the fight, as well as the mundane realities of military life and culture. It wasn’t long before a rash of blogs - dubbed “milblogs” and written by soldiers in the field and civilians back home, many of whom were veterans-emerged to describe life in a military at war and complain about the press’s failings, real or imagined.

An email discussion with Michael Totten

Michael Totten kindly responded to my post A look at the writings of “war blogger” Michael J. Totten.  I have reformatted our email exchange into an interview format, posted with his permission.

MJT:  I heartily agree that my older work is a lot more simplistic than what I write now. I didn’t jump from blogger to journalist based on those old posts you reference, but from my reports in the field.  I don’t know what your point is in the piece you just wrote, but it reminded me of how much I have grown and why I wanted to get away from armchair commentary in the first place.

FM:  This is a series on how we got here in the war — especially about how we get information on the war from bloggers.  The role of the bloggers has been a focus of mine this year, such as the recent posts about Basra and before that about the ”cut cable crisis” (here and here).  I picked an early period in your work to avoid confusion with your reporting from Iraq.  Also, (as you note) these posts had a clear theme and viewpoint.  Another advantage of examing older work:  time gives us more perspective. 

How do you see your influence on the American public during this period?

A look at the writings of “war blogger” Michael J. Totten

Michael J. Totten has made the jump from blogger to major media journalist, published in LA Weekly, Reason, Commentary, the NY Daily News, the Wall Street Journal, and this week in the New York Times.  As one of the best known war bloggers, and with a long publication record, we can understand more about this important phenomenon by looking at his work.  These blogs play an increasinly large role informing Americans about the war, not only via influential sites such as the Instapundit but also through the mainstream media.

I reviewed the posts on Totten’s website, Middle East Journal, concerning Iraq from July 2003 - June 2005 – when the decisions were made embedding America in Iraq for the foreseeable future.  Forecasting is one of the most difficult games, so we will not use our advantage of hindsight to play gotcha.  Let us look at these with the perspective time gives us, evaluating the quality of his analysis now that many of these debates of this period have cooled.

Today Totten skillfully writes from Iraq about his personal experiences, properly acknowledging that much of his information comes from talking to soldiers.  However, he seems unaware that this provides a one dimensional picture of the war.  A vivid one, but as in the blind men and the elephant, it does not reveal the overall picture.  (Today was omitted from the original text)

The period I examine predates his time in Iraq.  Here are a few conclusions, subjective of course.

1. Lacking that connection to on-the-spot soldiers, it looks like mostly pro-war cheer-leading — almost propaganda.  Cherry-picking good news to create a false impression. 
2. Totten displays little evidence (in this period) of actual knowledge about Iraq.  For example, he seldom bothers to identify the sect or ethnicity of the Iraq people he discusses; usually there are just Iraqis and terrorists. 
3. He writes as we were fighting a unitary enemy in Iraq, unlike reality in which we fight — at various times — Shia Arabs, foreign jihadists, Sunni Arabs, and criminal gangs of all sorts.  He also ignores that some of Iraq’s insurgent groups have large bases of popular support.
4. Totten shows little awareness of the limits of American power or limitations on our right to re-shape other peoples to fit our mold.