US National Intelligence Estimates - an archive
What is a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)? As explained in the August 2007 NIE (see below):
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests. NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily “estimative”-that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and identify the implications for US policy.
Key websites for information about NIEs
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence
- National Intelligence Council (NIC) — Reporting to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and providing the President and senior policymakers with analyses of foreign policy issues that have been reviewed and coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community. They have published declassified NIEs (sold in print and on CD) about China (1948 - 1976), Vietnam (1948 - 1975), and Yugoslavia (1948 - 1990).
- Browse the publications of the NIC (1946 - 1994) — Find declassified NIEs by using “National Intelligence Estimate” on the advanced search screen.
Background information about NIEs
- National Intelligence Estimates, Sharon Otterman, Council on Foreign Relations (15 July 2004) — Excellent introduction to NIEs.
- A Crucial Estimate Relived, Sherman Kent, Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1964) — a reevaluation of the 1962 NIE proclaiming the Soviet Union would not put offensive weapons in Cuba.
- Excerpts from the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 10-41 “The Likelihood of Japanese Military Attack” (4 December 1941) — This is a must-read for anyone interested in the collection and analysis of intelligence, about the most important NIE (more specifically, the most important NIE never made).
Will future NIE’s be partially declassified and released?
“Officials Lean Toward Keeping Next Iraq Assessment Secret“, Washington Post (7 March 2088)
A new National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq is scheduled to be completed this month, according to U.S. intelligence officials. But leaders of the intelligence community have not decided whether to make its key judgments public, a step that caused an uproar when key judgments in an NIE about Iran were released in November.
… Key NIE judgments on Iraq had previously been made public, beginning with a highly controversial October 2002 assessment warning that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. That estimate was later proved wrong, with no such weapons discovered in Iraq after the U.S. invasion, and the matter led to charges that the intelligence community had been politicized by the Bush administration.
“Overall, professional life is less complicated if nothing becomes public, and one doesn’t have to organize classified assessments always having in the back of one’s mind, ‘If this is ever leaked, how would it read’ ” in the news media, a former intelligence analyst said.
Declassified versions of recent NIEs
-
Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive (August 2007) — Update to NIE of January 2007.
- The Terrorist Threat to the US Homelane (July 2007)
- Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead (January 2007)
- Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (prepared April 2006, released 26 September 2006)
- Transformation through Integration and Innovation – National Intelligence Strategy of the US (26 October 2005)
- Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (October 2002) — a 28 page declassified version of the 90 page original. The Senate Intelligence Committee published an analysis of this and other pre-war intelligence (July 2004, 521 pages, the pdf is here on the CFR website).
Please send comments and criticisms to me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling).
