“High Stakes South of the Border”

Two of the many benefits of subscribing to Stratfor are (1) its reporting on geopolitical trends not yet visible to the mainstream media, and (2) it provides a window into the thinking of America’s elites (Stratfor’s customers, senior business and government officials with whom it must stay in synch).

We get both in a new report:  “High Stakes South of the Border.”  This continues their excellent reporting during the past few years on the disintegration of Mexico’s polity — another “decline of the state” in progress.  Just as interesting, Stratfor’s conclusion shows its (and our) assumption of America’s unlimited power and resources.

U.S. forces are largely preoccupied in Iraq and Afghanistan. While it would take a great deal to tip the scale toward a U.S. military intervention in Mexico, we may now be at a point where that has to be considered given what is at stake.

The media discover info ops, with outrage!

The media have discovered that our military has mastered the key 4GW skill of running information operations.  Thoroughly researched and well-written, the following is probably one of the most important news stories of the year.   I strongly recommend reading it.

“Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand“, New York Times, 20 April 2008 — “A Pentagon Campaign:  Retired officers have been used to shape terrorism coverage from inside the TV and radio networks. “

This should not be news.  In November 2007 I described good news:  our military had learned how to run successful information operations.  Unfortunately, they were running them against us.  Mine was not the first such article. 

One of the best to date examined the propaganda of the pre-war and early war phases.  Boehlert’s account of Bush’s Imperial press conference on 6 March 2003 is worth the price of his book, recounting the moment in which “please stand for the President of the United States” in effect gave way to to “bow before the President of the United States.”

“Lapdogs“, Eric Boehlert, Salon (4 May 2006) — “Cowardly and clueless, the U.S. media abandoned its post as Bush led the country into a disastrous war. A look inside one of the great journalistic collapses of our time. This is an excerpt from former Salon senior writer Eric Boehlert’s new book Lapdogs: How the Press Rolled Over for Bush.”

Many do not see any problem with this, like this post at Winds of Change.  Almost nobody discusses the real problem with government propaganda:  it undermines people’s trust of and identification with the State.  That is bad even for tyrannies like the USSR; it is a potentially terminal problem for a republic. 

Whatever the short-term benefits of info ops — in this case, building public support for a long war — it undermines the foundation of our political regime.  That should be an unacceptable price in the Decline of the State era, in which strengthening people’s relationship with the government must be a paramount strategic goal.

Update:  A comment about this story by W. Patrick Lang (Colonel, US Army, retired), posted at Sic Semper Tyrannis (19 April 2008):

I was invited to one briefing at the Pentagon. At the meeting, many of those mentioned in this article were present. The purpose of the meeting was to give Rumsfeld the chance to explain the Abu Ghraib mess. I asked some awkward questions and was not invited again.

Update:  A comment by Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner (23 April 2008) that concurs with my conclusion (mentioned above).  The full post is worth reading!  Excerpt:

In the end, I don’t see this as an issue of legality, but one of credibility and trust. The Rumsfeldian Defense Department clearly failed to understand the importance of these two elements in Information Age conflict and counterinsurgency, which has been ably documented elsewhere.

( click for more about how our military has mastered this key 21st century military skill)

Visionaries point the way to success in the age of 4GW

After WWII we entered the age in which 4GW is the primary mode of warfare.  In response first come analysts, followed by visionaries, then solutions (in three kinds).

Analysts (see this chapter) and visionaries provide the foundation on which solutions are build.  Visionaries propose radical ideas for the conduct of warfare (beyond anything we can do today) or even visions of new geopolitical regimes.  They play several essential roles. Their creativity provides new directions to more conventional experts. Their imaginations provide vigor and energy to stimulate others to write about 4GW. Their writings appeal to both the public and decision-makers in a way that few analysts can equal, communicating the nature of modern war to a large audience much as Carl Sagan did for science.

Like Sagan, successful visionaries earn more money than almost anyone else in their field.  This is the “sweet spot” in any profession, offering fame and fortune.

Insights about modern war from the NIC’s 2020 Project

Summary:  the papers from a workshop of the NIC’s 2020 Project provide valuable insights.  This post discusses a paper by Martin van Creveld, and then ends with a speculative question.

As part of their ”2020 Project”, the National Intelligence Council held a workshop on the “Changing Nature of Warfare” on 25 May 2004.  Key topics and questions focused on surveying the prospects for conflict around the world between today and 2020.

1. What are the contemporary characteristics of war that are likely to persist into the future?
2. How can we tell, are there signposts?
3. What are the characteristics of contemporary conflict that are likely to be consigned to the dustbin of history by 2020?
4. What are the emerging characteristics of war?

Many of the papers are relevant today and worth reading.  One in particular seems prophetic four years later:  Martin van Creveld’s “Modern Conventional Warfare: An Overview“.  As usual for his work, it was packed with insights. 

4GW: A solution of the first kind - Robots!

Just as visionaries earn more than analysts, so do solutions of the first kind (hardware) receive more funding than solutions of the second (ideas) or the third kind (ways to attract, retain, and train people).  This is life in modern America.  This is why we continue to lose at 4GW.

The big money is in building things.  Sometimes they work, like the F-16.  Sometimes they do not, like the nuclear aircraft engine.  Sometimes they work but are too expensive to produce, like the XM2001 Crusader.  Sometimes they are too expensive to produce, but we do so anyway — like the F-22.  Now it appears that robots are the future of defense procurement, as seen in these articles.

4GW: A solution of the third kind

Solutions of the first kind… new things (i.e., robots, autonomous flying vehicles,
software to help us understand and manipulate foreign societies).

Solutions of the second kind… new ideas about tactics and strategy.

Solutions of the third kind… new ways to shape our institutions
– aka politics — usually by altering how they recruit, train, and promote people. 

Don Vandergriff (Major, US Army, retired) is one of the very few actually implementing 4GW solutions of the third kind, with his work for the Army on new methods of training leaders.  He now has a blog here, writing as an expert on leader development, personnel management and fourth generation warfare.

I strongly recommend visiting his blog for a look at the cutting edge of 4GW (at least, work on our side about 4GW).  For links to his online articles and list of his books, see The Essential 4GW reading list: Chapter Two, Donald Vandergriff.

Please share your comments by posting below (brief and relevant, please) — especially with suggestions about links worth adding — or email me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling).

Previous posts in this series

1. Arrows in the Eagle’s claw — solutions to 4GW, chapter I
2. Arrows in the Eagle’s claw — Chapter II, about 4GW analysts
3. A solution to 4GW — the introduction
4. How to get the study of 4GW in gear
5. 4GW: A solution of the second kind – Shawn Brimley has provided an example of a solution of the second kind with “A Grand Strategy of Sustainment”.  It is good, but solutions of the second kind do us little good.
6. 4GW: A solution of the third kind – Don Vandergriff is one of the very few today implementing solutions of the third kind.

Dark origins of the new COIN manual, FM 3-24

Summary:  A follow-up to this post about the use of social science language and concepts in FM 3-24.  They provide useful terminology, but at the cost of either weakening the beliefs of our troops or giving them a “grey net of abstraction to cover the world in order to simplify and explain it in a way that is pleasing to us.”  The former would be disastrous in 4GW, the latter probably useless exercise.  Or worse than useless, creating the illusion of understanding foreign cultures which eliminates the bafflement that leads to study, thought, and partial understanding.  While it is easy to dismiss these fears, the social sciences themselves note the powerful effect of language on thought and behavior.

One of the interesting aspects of the new COIN manual, FM 3-24, is its use of technical sociological terminology ripped from the intellectual framework of its creators (e.g. Max Weber) — a framework both dark and alien to American culture.  In it “We hold these truths to be self-evident” reflects the naive thinking of a lost age, and can be believed only by “a few big babies in university chairs or in editorial offices”  (from  Weber’s “Science as a Vocation“).  In it our core beliefs  — liberty, freedom of religion, equality of races and genders, democracy and free enterprise — are just choices, like those of any other culture.  As such we have no basis on which to advocate any of practices to other cultures (other than Mao’s adage that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun”).

To illustrate this, here are some excepts from Allan Bloom’s great work Closing of the American Mind in which he describes the origins of these concepts.

On the dark roots of this framework

It is amazing to me that the irrational source of all conscious life in Freud, and the relativity of all values in Weber, did not pose a problem for them and their optimism about science.  … {Weber’s} science was formulated as a doubtful dare against the chaos of things, and values certainly lay beyond its limits.  That is what the very precarious, not to say imaginary, distinction between facts and values meant.

4GW: A solution of the second kind

Solutions of the first kind:  new things (i.e., robots, autonomous flying vehicles,
software to help us understand and manipulate foreign societies).

Solutions of the second kind:  new ideas about tactics and strategy.

Solutions of the third kind:  new ways to shape our institutions (aka politics),
usually by altering how they recruit, train, and promote people.

Shawn Brimley has provided an example of a solution of the second kind with “A Grand Strategy of Sustainment“, posted at the Small Wars Journal (20 March 2008). I agree with almost everything he says, which seems to be in the broad current of work about grand strategy in the era of post-trinitiarian conflicts — in which 4GW has become the dominant mode of war. William Lind, Chet Richards, me, and many others have said similar things.

Most of these works focus on description of a desired new tactic and strategy, with little analysis of why we in fact do things differently or how can our institutions effect these new ideas. Such analysis usually features ample use of “American should do” this and that. A key factor in solutions of the second kind is why we have our current policies, and that answer suggests the cure used by each author.

A key to the power of FM 3-24, the new COIN manual

(later additions to the text are in red)   FM 3-24 provides a basis for DoD’s people to describe a society. This is sketched out under “Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment” (3-16 through 3-65+) using standard social science definitions. This is valuable, as we cannot describe that for which we lack the words, and clear language promotes clear thinking.  Ths post discusses the problematic nature of the Army using language and concepts from the social sciences, following yesterday’s post discussing the limited operational utility of social science theories.

General Semantics teaches us that language is a process of abstraction, and can sometimes give just the illusion of knowledge. The map is not the territory. The name is not the thing itself. The deeper we go in this section of FM 3-24, the deeper gets the waters. To take a small example: as Americans we can talk about clans, races, and other groups … but understanding their hold on people’s minds and feelings is far more difficult. As we climb the ladder to more abstract concepts, their meaning becomes more difficult to grasp.

3-44. A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end state of existence.

Values are the bedrock on which many people build their lives. Americans are taught in most colleges that facts and values are different things, a concept with roots in western philosophy going back to Hume. Believing that values are not facts puts one in a different cultural universe from that of many other peoples, who believe that their values are not personally chosen but instead rooted in reality … derived from God. The Army can teach the words, but the music is more difficult to learn.

An implied message of western social sciences can be that “we” are superior to “them”. After all, Max Weber taught “us” that values are just beliefs, while “they” do not know this — foolishly regarding their values as permanent and enduring facts about the universe. Armed with these insights, it must be difficult not to patronize the locals (especially in the ancient societies of the Middle East, which had a high civilization when the people of Britain painted themselves blue and worshiped trees). Even worse, these insights might encourage officers to believe they actually understand these foreign societies (much of the language in FM 3-24 encourages this). Worst of all would be belief that the Anthropology 101 concepts allow us to successfully manipulate foreign societies (see yesterday’s post for more about this last point. Much of the professional training in these fields is to overcome these tendencies.

As an example, consider one simple and clear typology from FM 3-24 (from the work of Max Weber):

The 2 most devastating 4GW attacks on America, and the roots of FM 3-24

Summary:  building COIN strategies upon our ability to successfully change foreign societies (from infornmation operations up to governmental reform) is like basing our monetary policy on our ability to change straw into gold. 

The United States has suffered several devastating 4GW attacks since WWII, perhaps the two worst being…

•  Ignoring the recommendation of the Moynihan Report (”The Negro Family: The Case For National Action“, US Department of Labor, March 1965).  Instead of providing government support to black Americans in a way that supported their families, Federal support was exquisitely designed to undermine their family and community structures.  The result is a large almost dysfunctional underclass, with areas like Harlem in worse shape than they were in 1964.  (see Obama’s comment, below)
• The credibility of the US government in the eyes of its people has been shattered, so that its statements are widely considered lies.  “Never believe anything the government says until the second denial.”  Economic statistics are considered manipulated by many on Wall Street.  Many African-Americans believe that the US government distributed crack and started the AIDS epidemic. 

That is, these would have been devastating 4GW attacks on America, of the fashionable “cultural warfare” and info-ops variants — except that we were the agents.  These are major failures in our government’s social engineering.  We have to do better; our apparent inability to do so is a major factor in the decline of the state.  But that is not the point of this post.

If basic social engineering is often beyond our capabilities at home — where our knowledge and tools are considerable — what about our ability to do this in foreign lands, the keystone to modern COIN theory?  For example, before doing info-ops or seeking to alter a society, what must one know about that society?

Excerpt from FM 3-24 (the new COIN manual): 

How to get the study of 4GW in gear

Here is an question by Jason lifted from the comments on A solution to 4GW — the introduction.

Fabius, if you reference “Masters of War” by Michael Handel (which I am reading), the author makes the point that even 4GW is Trinitarian since you still have the three components - the state, the populace, and the non-state actor. Even if the non-state actor is embedded within the populace, there is a distinction between the general populace, which must be agitated to support the state against the non-state actor.

This is interesting on several levels.  It offers a legitimate question, keying off the work of an expert in military history (Handel being one of the top scholars in his generation of Clausewitz’s works; he died in 2001 — correction per Jason in the comments ).  It also offers insight as to why the study of 4th generation warfare has progressed so little in the past five or ten years.  The question having been debated at length in many forums, I will slight it in favor of the second issue — which seems of immediate and practical significance.

A solution to 4GW - the introduction

 We now have an adequate basis upon which to develop a solution for 4GW (at least, a “Mark I” version).  Three recent books provide the last missing pieces of this puzzle:

• If We Can Keep It by Chet Richards  (aka IWCKI)
• Brave New War by John Robb  (BNW)
• The Changing Face of War by Martin van Creveld

None of these are long (IWCKI is only 152 pages) or inaccessible to the general reader, as they are clearly conceived and well-written.  These works build on the foundation of many other books and articles since the study of 4GW began (using an arbitrarily point) with publication of Into the Fourth Generation by William Lind et al (1989), and Martin van Creveld’s Transformation of War (1991) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999).

We must define the problem before attempting to describe a solution.  Thomas Kuhn described a paradigm as shared body of knowledge, definitions, and assumptions, allowing communication among workers in a specific field, and focusing their research on agreed-upon key questions.  Modern war lacks a consensus on these things; hence the debate frequently devolves into cacophony.  Even the “community” talking about 4GW lacks a tight paradigm, and the discussion seems to be fragmenting with the multiplication of war’s generations (5th gen, 6th gen) and criticisms — often quite valid – of 4GW as (in my words) a hall of mirrors.   (See this post on DNI for more on the definition of 4GW)

This might result from the conceptual basis of 4GW having been ripped from the context established in van Creveld’s writings, without regard for the distinction he draws between the broad class of non-Trin conflicts and war (the latter being a subset of the former).  Can we build a more-or-less agreed upon framework to facilitate discussion?  (Paradigms are conceptual tools, not miniature versions of reality)

Theories about 4GW are not yet like the Laws of Thermodynamics

One of the baleful influences on the 4GW analysis is the science of Psychohistory developed by Hari Seldon, capable of accurately predicting history (as described in the Foundation novels of Isaac Asimov).  Social science “laws” in the real world are just heuristics, generalities not to be confused with the Laws of Thermodynamics.  This is especially true in military theory.  For example, Clausewitz’s On War opens with some general rules (e.g., the relationship between offense and defense), which he then elaborates with great detail but no certainty (having experience at war, he knew the limits of theories about people).

This is important, as progress in understanding 4GW requires distilling out more of these general relationships from the mass of 20th century history.  For example, in January 2007 I postulated that insurgencies come in two flavors, depending on the role of foreigners.  Chet Richards refined this differentialtion of insurgency types into …

• Classical insurgency: a revolution, in other words, in which a sizable fraction of the population opposes what they consider to be an illegitimate or oppressive government, as the American colonies did in 1776-1781. The goal of the insurgent groups may be either to take control of the central government or to achieve independence for a portion of the population.
• War of national liberation: in which a sizable fraction of the people in a country throws out an occupying foreign power, as Vietnam did to us in 1965-1975.

From the Introduction to If We Can Keep It (IWCKI)

ABCDs for today: About Blitzkrieg, COIN, and Diplomacy

Here and here I discussed our tactical retreat in Anbar Province of Iraq.  Dan Tdaxp raises an interesting and valuable question (here) about this:  what does “retreat” mean in 4GW?

The previous generations of war occured in physical space.  We plot their course on maps, using lines and arrows.  A  3GW “retreat” means movement away from geographic objectives. 

Can we show the course of the Iraq War on a map?  Not easily, as 4GW occurs in social space (aka human terrain).  For example, we speak of the “moral high ground”.  Also note the growing role of anthropologists (e.g. Kilcullen) and the social sciences (e.g., in FM 3-24) in counter-insurgency (COIN) theory and practice.  Update:  Ralph Peter’s article “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations” (Parameters, Spring 2000), esp. his challenge at the end, is a poorly-recognised milestone of 4GW analysis –reintroducing the social sciences to the art of 4GW. 

In 4GW “retreat” means movement away from objectives expressed in people terms:  building institutions, changing loyalties, motivating friends and de-motivating opponents.  Traditionally these are strategic considerations — diplomatic maneuvers, the decisive factors in many wars.  Our alliance with France made victory possible for the American Revolution.  Gaining support in Britan led to the rapid collapse of Britain’s will to fight after Yorktown and their generous terms in the Treaty of Paris (1783).  The Union inflamed Britain’s hatred of slavery to keep the UK out of the Civil War, a necessary ingredient for victory.

Valuable new insights about the culture of war… a preview

Western writers about military and political theory sees war as a largely rational activity, at least on a state to state level.  Clausewitz sees it as an extension of politics, a tools of policy to advance the State’s goals.  Marx looks at its economic basis.  Much of the game theory that drives military simulations resembles chess more than anything done by Paraguay during the War of the Triple Alliance, or Japan in early 1945. 

Today many prominent American advocate long wars against what are, in our eyes, irrational foes.  Neo-conservatives like William Kristol urge wars to defend rationally-based western societies against irrational, expansionist Islamic fanatics — “Islamofascists.”  Visionaries like Thomas Barnett call for neocolonial wars against “gap” peoples, those who have not yet seen the light of civilization.  Presidential candidate McCain believes we should fight in Iraq for a hundred years if necessary, against enemies he sees in the shadows but does not clearly describe (Here is the text and video, also here).

Do we understand these foes?  Do we understand what drives us to wage yet another long war, just after the conclusion of the Cold War, to spend more on defense than the by the rest of the world combined?  While folks like Kristol and Barnett give cool lectures in comfortable conference rooms, where calm reason is in the very air, massive wars are waged in the third world which barely register on the American consciousness and lie beyond our understanding.  Nigeria (1967-69).  Ethiopia - Eritrea (see here).  Hutu vs. Tutsis (Rwanda, 1994).  Congo (1998 - , see here and here).  Sudan (see here).  Senseless blood-thirsty war, without rules, without any logic other than that of the knife.

There is a large literature about the irrational roots of war.  Perhaps best known is John Keegan’s A History of Warfare.  While not the refutation of Clausewitz that he intended (The opening line is “War is not the continuation of policy by other means.”), it proves several interesting case studies of why societies have waged war.  Keegan says…

Recommendation to read: “Is Warfighting Enough” by Richards and Vandergriff

“Is Warfighting Enough?” by Chet Richards (Colonel, USAF, retired) and Don Vandergriff (Major, USA, retired) — now available online in the February 2008 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette.

The shelves of many libraries groan under the weight of articles calling for new ways of analyzing geopolitical and military issues.  In four pages this article shows how the theories of John Boyd can provide this, which we desperately need.  Instead of yet another analysis of 4GW, this sketches out solutions – practical methods for building forces capable of fighting 4GW’s, and how to use them.

Another valuable aspect of this article:  both Richards and Vandergriff are excellent writers, able to express complex reasoning in a clear and brief fashion.

About the The Marine Corps Gazette

There are many good periodicals about modern warfare.  I consider The Marine Corps Gazette to be one of the best.  Since the publication in 1989 of the Lind et al article Into the Fourth Generation it has been in the forefront of coverage of and discussion about the paradoxes and challenges of 4GW.  The Gazette is available to members and subscribers only.  If you’re eligible, join!  If you’re not, subscribe!  Click here for details.

For more on this subject

• For more about the Adaptive Leaders Course:  Recommended reading: transforming the Army, the hard way
• The Adaptive Leadership Symposium will be held on 19 March 2008 at Greenville SC.  Download the conference brochure here (234 kb PDF).
• For a links to the online works of Donald Vandergriff:  The Essential 4GW reading list: Chapter Two, Donald Vandergriff.
• For links to the online works of John Boyd see the DNI archive page, which also lists books about Boyd and his thinking.
• Boyd’s theories are explained in more detail in Chet Richard’s book Certain to Win.

The Achilles’ Heel of military simulations

The rigging of the Millennium Challenge 2002 simulation echos events in the planning for the Vietnam War.  Chapter 21 of David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest describes the elaborate simulations run to prepare for our involvement in Vietnam, each involving weeks of preparation and conducted by senior military and civilian officials.  The first set did not go well for the Blue Team.  Then we see the first weakness of all analytical tools:  moral weakness of the human components, as they cheat in order to get the desired result.

The second set of war games went a little better. … There was a greater US willingness to commit more and more of its resources to the war, and corollary change among the North Vietnamese, a downplaying of their willingness to meet the larger American commitment.

As Joshua Foust says, in his forthright manner: 

Are war games a competitive edge of conventional forces vs. non-state 4GW foes?

I recommend reading the threat on military simulations that started here and has moved over to the DNI blog.  Some of the participants have considerable experience in this field.  Here are a few thoughts about the value of military simulations, esp. as a tool to accelerate the transformation of conventional military forces — their adaption to an age in which 4GW is the dominant form of war.

Simulations allow organizations to test themselves in a changing world, against potential enemies.  As discussed previously, they are an antidote — perhaps the antidote — to victory disease.  But only if the designers, operators, and participants allow for the good guys to fail — and if senior decision-makers listen to the results (more on these considerations in the next post in this series).

The roots of military simulations are lost in history.  Kriegsspiel, German for war game, was developed in 1824 to train Prussian officers.  The US military use of simulations has accelerated since the early applications of the 1950’s.  The Millennium Challenge exercise cost $250 million, the largest of the hundreds of simulation projects run in recent years.  This history shows that simulations have the potential to force innovation by highlighting weaknesses in doctrine and force structure, but can just as powerfully serve to re-enforce the status quo.

Martin van Creveld has a few things to say about war games.  Considering his track record, I suggest that we listen closely.

War games, the antidote to “Victory disease”

This post about the 2002 Millennium Challenge war games has sparked such a valuable discussion that it is being moved to the DNI blog (update:  it is here).  Stay tuned, as this will be worthwhile reading. For a good introduction to the subject of war games — more formally, “military simulations” — see the Wikipedia entry.

Are simulations a competitive edge of conventional forces vs. 4GW foes? A paper by Michael Macedonia (Colonel, USA, retired) from a 2001 Forum describes a problem facing the US military, and how simulations can provide a solution.

The US military is undergoing a major policy shift in its approach to training and education. In essence, it is trying to avoid its version of Christensen’s “innovator’s dilemma” known as “the Victory Disease.”

The victory disease is the subject of the seminal book by Macedonia and war game designer Jim Dunnigan, Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Gulf War and Beyond (1993).

“{victory disease is} … the affliction that is caught by most armies and nations after they have won a war. The disease is characterized by arrogance, a tendency to believe myths as to the underlying reasons for victory, and firm conviction that future conflicts should be fought the same way.

For more on “victory disease”, see the Wikipedia here describing it, and here describing historical examples. I also recommend reading Major Timothy M. Karcher’s 2003 article in Military Review.

4GW is the “world turned upside down“, and victory disease prevents us from realizing its implications.

Simulations allow organizations to test themselves in a changing world, against potential enemies — hopefully avoiding the hard and expensive lessons of war. They are an antidote — perhaps the antidote — to victory disease. But only if the designers, operators, and participants allow for the good guys to fail — and decision-makers pay attention.

Please share your comments (brief and relevant, please), or email me at (spam-protected spelling) fabmaximus at hotmail dot com.

Update:  Zenpundit’s note on this series is (as usual) worth a look.  Esp. his comments on the nature and function of gaming, both military and in general.

Other posts on this subject

• Recommended reading: an autopsy of the 2002 Millennium Challenge war games
• Are war games a competitive edge of conventional forces vs. non-state 4GW foes?
• The Achilles’ Heel of military simulations
• During Millenium Challenge 2002, by Ed Beakley (Project White Horse blog), posted at the DNI blog
• What we should have learned from MC02, by Dag von Lubitz, posted at the DNI blog

Recommended reading: an autopsy of the 2002 Millennium Challenge war games

War games rigged?  General says Millennium Challenge 02 ‘was almost entirely scripted’, By Sean D. Naylor in the Army Times (16 August 2002)

Vignettes like this illustrate the structural ills of our defense apparatus better than any theoretical analysis can.

The most elaborate war game the U.S. military has ever held was rigged so that it appeared to validate the modern, joint-service war-fighting concepts it was supposed to be testing, according to the retired Marine lieutenant general who commanded the game’s Opposing Force. …

What happened?  The set up… 

 The Defense Department spent $250 million over the last two years to stage Millennium Challenge 02, a three-week, all-service exercise that concluded Aug. 15. The experiment involved 13,500 participants waging mock war in 17 simulation locations and nine live-force training sites.

Such games, staged at vast cost, are powerful tools — a great competitive edge of conventional military forces.  But only when conducted by officers with the courage to subject their doctrines to a fair test, in organizations that allow BOTH innovation and failure during testing without risk to the careers of the innovators.

Gen. William “Buck” Kernan, head of Joint Forces Command, told Pentagon reporters July 18 that Millennium Challenge was nothing less than “the key to military transformation.”  Central to the success of the war game, Kernan said, was that the U.S. force (or Blue Force) would be fighting a determined and relatively unconstrained Opposing Force (otherwise known as the OPFOR or Red Force).  “This is free play,” he said. “The OPFOR has the ability to win here.”

Sounds good so far…