“After the Iraqi Offensive“, An address by Colonel H. R. McMaster (US Army), sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute (13 May 2008). Reported in the Army Times: “O-6: No question about Iran role in violence“ (14 May 2008) - Excerpt:
McMaster also said that the Iraqi thwarting of the recent uprising in Basra, which officials have said involved significant Iranian backing, may have spoiled a larger regional destabilization effort.
It is possible, McMaster said, “that this bold, very quick action by the prime minister in Basra foiled what was to be, perhaps, a much larger and coordinated effort - maybe even coordinated with efforts in other places in the region, like what’s been happening right now in Lebanon.”
The Iraqi military response to the March militia uprising in Basra, ordered by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, was initially described as an ineffective failure. But his firing of ineffectual commanders was followed by tactical success and a ceasefire, and is said to have enhanced his status.
Has anyone seen reporting about this March militia uprising in Basra? If so, please share your information with us by posting a comment.
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English-language sources have reported little about Basra since the fighting burned down, but what little I see supports the war-bloggers’ narrative more than that of the US-based area experts. That is, the fighting does appear to have strengthened the position of the central government vs. al Sadar’s Mahdi Army. This article strongly supports this theory, adding to those cited in my 25 April post.
“Drive in Basra by Iraqi Army Makes Gains“, New York Times (12 May 2008) — Excerpt:
Three hundred miles south of Baghdad, the oil-saturated city of Basra has been transformed by its own surge, now seven weeks old. In a rare success, forces loyal to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki have largely quieted the city, to the initial surprise and growing delight of many inhabitants who only a month ago shuddered under deadly clashes between Iraqi troops and Shiite militias.
Just as in Baghdad, Iraqi and Western officials emphasize that the gains here are “fragile,” like the newly planted roadside saplings that fail to conceal mounds of garbage and pools of foul-smelling water in the historic port city’s slums.
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Contents
I. Articles by and about Ann Marlowe, the Human Terrain System, and the Afghanistan War have been added to the ”Antrhopologists Go to War” reference page.
II. “Costly Lesson on How Not to Build a Navy Ship“, New York Times (25 April 2008) – An amazing new chapter in the story of the Navy’s death Spiral.
III. “Iraqi forces see victory in Basra“, Inside Iraq Blog at The Times (25 April 2008) — More evidence that the war bloggers were right, the area experts wrong about the fighting in Basra.
IV. “Drug Battle Leaves 15 Slain in Tijuana“, Reuters (26 April 2008) — Mexico internal security situation continues to deteriorate, another “Decline of the State” in progress. More on this tomorrow.
V. Update: “Why this crisis is still far from finished“, Mohamed El-Erian, Financial Times (24 April 2008) — The financial fore-shocks have passed, but major shock — the recession — lies ahead.
VI. Update: “The Pentagon Strangles Our Economy: Why the U.S. Has Gone Broke“, Chalmers Johnson, Le Monde diplomatique (26 April 2008) — “60 years of enormous military spending is taking a dramatic toll on the rest of the economy.”
Here are this week’s news stories you might have missed…
I. Articles by and about Ann Marlowe, the Human Terrain System, and the Afghanistan War
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Here is a comment from Bill Roggio about these posts about war bloggers, posted with his permission.
The series you have run here is valuable. I am very interested in seeing how this plays out. I certainly appreciate both the tone and nature of your postings, and your willingness to have a civil and productive discussion. We need more of this kind of debate and analysis, and less of the uncivil “debates” - if you can call them that - that exist throughout much of the Internet. My sincerest thanks.
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Bill Roggio, Editor of the Long War Journal, generously replied to my posts about his recent reports concerning events in Basra. See his bio here.
Comment #1
I certainly appreciate the attention you’ve given me for the Basrah reporting. I do think you are drawing the wrong conclusions to my reports.
I am surprised you can say my reporting brims with “certainty and simplicity” and then call the mainstream reports “tentative.” Go reread them, and ask yourself who is declaring a winner and a loser? Is that not the definition of “certainty and simplicity”, to claim to know who won and who lost? I have done no such thing — I have never said the government or Sadr has won. I challenge you to find a statement from me that said I believed the Iraqi government was victorious. You are assuming this from reading the reports. But you would be wrong to think that I declared a winner or loser.
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War bloggers are the foundation of one chain providing information and analysis of the Iraq War to American citizens. The previous posts in this series provided evidence indicating that their view often tends to be both skewed and inaccurate. This post looks at websites higher in this chain, again using the recent events in Basra as a test case to evaluate their accuracy.
For example, see The Instapundit– one of the most influential American bloggers — who has consistently focused on reporting of the war bloggers instead of actual experts on Middle Eastern affairs (e.g., note his many references to Michael Totten’s reports about Iraq during 2003 - 2005). This is, of course, and exception to the careful selection of sources that built his impressive reputation — seen, for example, in his linking on legal issues.
Today the Instapundit refers his readers to Austin Bay (Colonel, US Army Reserve, retired) for analysis of the Basra fighting. Here are links to his bio, published books and blog.
“Whittling Away at Sadr“, Austin Bay (2 April 2008) - (here is the original source for his syndicated columns) Excerpt:
After his outlaw militiamen raised white flags and skedaddled from their latest round of combat with the Iraqi Army, radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr declared victory.
He always does. He understands media bravado. He wagers that survival bandaged by bombast and swathed in sensational headlines is a short-term triumph. Survive long enough, and Sadr bets he will prevail.
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(#9 in a series) The recent events in Basra provide a test, allowing comparison of a war blogger’s analysis vs. that of experts. The previous post showed Bill Roggio’s view of the Basra fighting (as a sample of war-bloggers’ reporting). This post looks at both mainstream reporting and expert analysis. In the next few days or weeks, when the dust settles, we will see whose analysis was most accurate.
Note that expert analysis tends to be more tentative, with emphasis on the limits of the available data, and the complex, fluid nature of the situation. War blogger reports tend (a broad generalization, not always correct) to display both certainty and simplicity (sometimes approaching cartoon-like).
“ANALYSIS-Iraqi crackdown backfires, strengthens Sadrists“, Reuters (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:
Gareth Stansfield, a professor of Middle East politics at the University of Exeter in England, said Maliki had staked his political credibility on the show of force in Basra and lost. “Maliki’s credibility is shot at this point. He really thought his security forces could really do this. But he’s failed,” he said.
“reports of a truce, some reflections“, Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:
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(#9 in a series) Current events in Basra provide a test case to compare the accuracy of the war bloggers vs. that of conventional experts. This post shows of a prominent war blogger, Bill Roggio (Editor of the Long War Journal; see his bio here). The following post looks at the views of several experts.
{Update} I use Roggio’s work, like Totten’s in the earlier posts, as one of the best of the war bloggers. Roggio’s analysis about Basra differs from the experts’ view in two ways.
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LWJ describes the Basra fighting as a normal “government vs. militia” operation. This contrasts with analysis by regional experts, who emphasize the political dimensions of these operations - an apparent attempt by Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to prevent losses in the next elections.
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LWJ describes the operations as a success, contrast with analysts’ reports that this - based on what little we know - appears to be at best a tie, and more likely a win for al Sadr. See Marc Lynch’s reports here and here, and Chet Richard’s analysis here.
“Maliki: ‘Security operations in Basra will continue‘”, Bill Roggio, Editor of the Long War Journal (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:
One day after Muqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, called for his fighters to abandon combat, the fighting in Basrah has come to a near-halt, and the Iraqi security forces are patrolling the streets. While Sadr spokesman said the Iraqi government agreed to Sadr’s terms for the cease-fire, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki has said the security forces will continue operations in Basrah in the South. Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army took heavy casualties in Basrah, Nasiriyah, Babil, and Baghdad over the weekend, despite Sadr’s call for the end of fighting.
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(#8 in a series) One frequent response to my series on War Bloggers is that are a minor phenomenon, especially compared to the mainstream media. First that ignores the increasing prominence of the war bloggers. Second, this ignores their increasing role in the mainstream media - NY Times, Wall Street Journal, and now this — a glowing review in the influential Columbia Journalism Review.
Note: I use “mil-blogs” in the narrow sense of “blogs by soldiers”, per Major Elizabeth Robbins (US Army) in “Muddy Boots 10: the rise of Soldier blogs“, Military Review(September-October 2007). The CJR article uses the term in a wider sense, what I call “war bloggers.”
“Blogging the Long War“, Columbia Journalism Review(March/April 2008) - “Bill Roggio wants to be your source for conflict coverage”
When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, among the seven-hundred-odd journalists who embedded with combat units were few who were familiar with the military in any intimate way. To many critics, especially those with military experience, this revealed itself in the press’s coverage of the war, which they felt often missed the mark when it came to explaining the hows and the whys of the fight, as well as the mundane realities of military life and culture. It wasn’t long before a rash of blogs - dubbed “milblogs” and written by soldiers in the field and civilians back home, many of whom were veterans-emerged to describe life in a military at war and complain about the press’s failings, real or imagined.
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We have the usual stream of confident but contradictory reports about the current wave of fighting in Iraq. It is the confidence I find most interesting. My guess is that the confidence is more deserved in the second of the two articles shown below. The precise detail given in the first seems somewhat excessive. Note the first reporter uses body counts as a metric of success, the second speaks of the area controlled by each side — perhaps a small indicator of reliability.
Mahdi Army taking significant casualties in Baghdad, South, Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal (29 March 2008) — Excerpt:
With the fifth day of fighting in Baghdad, Basrah and the South completed, the Mahdi Army has suffered major losses over the past 36 hours. The Mahdi Army has not fared well over the past five days of fighting, losing an estimated two percent of its combat power, using the best case estimate for the size of the militia.
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Here are some more excellent reports on events in Basra, in addition to those I posted yesterday. In the first post, I - IV are links to what seem to me expert opinions. In the second post, #V gives examples of what looks to me like simplistic speculation. In this last post, VI and VII link to valuable background material. The Internet can make us smarter or dumber, depending on how we choose to use it.
The following two articles predate the current troubles, but provide valuable background information on the fragmentation of Iraq, the Mahdi Army and its role in Iraq.
VI. “Debating Devolution in Iraq“, Reidar Visser (10 March 2008) — Reidar Visser is a research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and editor of the Iraq website ww.historiae.org. Excerpt:
April 2008 is the month when the law for implementing federalism — adopted by the Iraqi parliament in October 2006 — comes into effect. For the first time in Iraqi history, areas of the country that desire a special federal status similar to that already enjoyed by Kurdistan may initiate a procedure for transforming themselves from ordinary governorates into “federal regions,” potentially acquiring such privileges as the right to establish local paramilitary forces and the right to negotiate local deals with foreign oil companies.
In order to obtain the rank of federal region, a governorate must hold a referendum in which no less than 50 percent of the electorate votes and a simple majority votes yes. If multiple governorates wish to band together in one federal region, the proposition must pass such a referendum in each province tagged for inclusion. (Only the Baghdad province is prohibited from forming part of a greater federal region.) If one targeted governorate says no, the federal project founders.
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(Update: Readers said that this post was too long, so it has been divided into 3 posts). Here are some more excellent reports on events in Basra, in addition to those I posted yesterday. Personally I have nothing to say about events in Basra, except two warnings regarding the flood of analysis flooding the media (these are not original, of course):
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There are no neutrals about the Iraq War. Watch for the narratives.
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Someone who can knowledgeably discuss events in Dallas might know little about Basra. An analysis based on reports in the media probably just piles ignorance on top of ignorance.
In this post, I - IV are links to what seem to me expert opinions. In the next post, #V gives examples of what looks to me like simplistic speculation. In the last post, VI and VII link to valuable background material. The Internet can make us smarter or dumber, depending on how we choose to use it.
I. As usual, John Robb has some interesting observations and forecasts - looking at events through the telescope of 4GW theory: “Sadr’s Defensive Strategy“, John Robb, posted at Global Guerrillas (26 March 2008)
II. “Long-Distance Reporting“, Jonathan Foreman, National Review Online (27 March 2008) — I do not know if the this is correct, but if so it is an important observation.
Check out the bylines on the news-reports on the fighting in Basra and see if you can find any foreign reporters who are actually in the city they are writing about. The New York Times’s James Glanzer is filing from a compound in Baghdad. The BBC’s reporters are doing the same. Depending on phone calls to more or less reliable - or partis-pris - Iraqi stringers at the other end of the country, they might as well be filing from Amman or Tel Aviv or New York.
… On the other hand there’s something impressive about reporters who may never have never visited Basra - the country’s second city and an hour’s flight away - sounding authoritative about the place and its atmosphere. This is mainstream reporting on the Iraq war as it has evolved. It’s why the Michaels Totten and Yon are so important, and the milblogs, and the Iraqi blogs like Healing Iraq.
III. “Expert: Current Iraq fighting not good guys vs bad“, The Swamp - blog of the Tribune’s Washington Bureau (26 March 2008). Excerpt:
This is the take of Anthony Cordesman, the insightful national security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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Google shows dozens or hundreds of websites with folks discussing the recent events in Basra. On one level that is good, helping us collectively absorb and digest what is happening in this war. On another it might hurt us more than it helps, as much of the discussion is by folks with little knowledge of Iraq — its players and dynamics. This is characteristic of modern America, from the upper echelons down to the grass roots.
The fragmentary accounts we have of the pre-war decision-making suggest that the discussions were closely held among senior decision-makers, with little input from the professional staff of DoD, State, and the intelligence community — the people who have actual knowledge of and experience in the Middle East. Looking back in history, where we can see more clearly, the Pentagon Papers show the same dynamic at work in the Vietnam War. As the time for major decisions grew near, the decision-makers excluded their supporting staff — relying on their personal body of experience and knowledge. Unfortunately, that was inadequate for the task — as we learned to our great sorrow.
With these lessons learned, perhaps we can do better in the future. For example, the Internet gives acess to several good sources of information about the fighting in Basra. Here are a few that I find valuable, in no particular order. Please tell us in the comments about sites you find of use!
I. “Who are the Iraq Security Forces“, W. Patrick Lang (Colonel, US Army, retired), posted at Sic Semper Tyrannis (26 March 2008)
So, there is fighting in Basra among the Shia? What a surprise! A showdown there between forces of the Mahdi Army and the rest has been “in the cards” for some time. The MSM talks as though the “Iraqi Security Forces” are something other than representatives of militia anti Sadrist forces among the Shia. That is not the case. The security forces really represent the power of some of the Shia parties/militias being used in this case against the Sadrists. There is an ongoing struggle among the major Shia factions in Iraq. One of these is the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr. Others include the Dawa allies of Prime Ministers Maliki, the al-Hakim faction (SIIC), the Badr Force (generally allied with Hakim) and Fadila in the Basra area.
Need a score card? Well… the “security forces” are full of Badr Force militia men. These people belong to an organization that was raised originally by Iran to fight against IRAQ. They have been recruited into the “security forces” in large numbers. They intend to break the Mahdi Army if they can and the US seems to approve of that idea.
Reinforcements have been sent from Karbala to Basra. Karbala is virtually ruled by the Badr Force.
The US has been treasuring the idea that the apparatus of the Iraqi state is other than a congeries of militia factions and parties. Once again the untruth of that is exposed.
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