A fascinating development of the Iraq War are the “war bloggers”, like Michael Yon and Bill Roggio, providing disintermediated news — non-journalists reporting directly from Iraq. Free from the commercial and political entanglements of the major media, war bloggers can precisely target their audience. Many of them report events using the narrative that brought Tom Clancy fame and fortune. It may do the same for them.
Clancy has a well-deserved reputation for technical accuracy, but the action takes place in a world unlike ours. In Clancy-world the equivalent of Prince Charles is a warm family man. The equivalent of Michael Gorbechav a wise statesman, steering Russia to a prosperous and democratic future. The CIA is efficient and effective. When Federal agents shoot someone, even a bad guy, they feel remorse (no episodes in his books like Ruby Ridge, Waco, or the too-numerous no-knock SWAT teams shootings of innocent people). Clancy-world is a better one than ours, and that might account for much of his popularity.
Similarly some war-bloggers provide a Disney-like view of the war, imposing a WWII-like narrative on Iraq. Probably this is what their readers want.
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Reporting the war as good guys — our allies — fighting bad guys (al Qaeda). But, like al Qaeda in Iraq, Shiite Arab and Sunni Arab militias have also done terrible things to civilians — murder, rape, ethnic cleanings (all those incidents reported daily at Juan Cole’s
Informed Comment). It paints a false picture to whitewash the militia in order to make al Qaeda look like the bad guys.
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Ignoring or minimizing the economic depression the war has imposed on Iraq, and the hardships causes by deterioration of basic services: sewage, clean water, electricity, health care.
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In Surrender in Al Anbar province I described the tactical retreat we made in Anbar, and why it may prove a wise move. History shows that apt tactical retreats have ocassionaly led to strategic gains, and often ended fruitless and expensive engagements.
While a big step backwards in terms of our strategic goals – to establish a strong, friendly Iraq State — this is probably a step towards peace in Iraq. Iraq is fragmenting, probably at best into a loose federation. Ending our fighting with the local elites in Anbar (and afterward throughout Iraq) — more than that, giving them our military and financial support – helps them to establish functioning local and regional governments.
I described this path to peace for Iraq in March and September of 2007. This post provides an update and shows a way forward. My thanks to those, like Smitten Eagle, who joined the discussion on “Surrender in Akbar” and whose questions and insights contributed this post.
Victory in Iraq
One of the major similarities between the Iraq and Vietnam Wars lies in our goals. In Vietnam we fought to prevent the nations of southeast Asia from falling into the Communist block — the Domino Theory. The dominos themselves did not believe this likely, and following our defeat were mostly correct.
In the summer of 2007 our goals in Iraq changed, silently — with no official changes to the White House Victory Conditions or to the Congressional Benchmarks (listed here). Almost everyone we fought become “al Qaeda”, and our aim was to prevent al Qaeda from taking Iraq (see this for detail on “al Qaeda as meta-enemy”). Like the domino theory, there is little or no evidence that this scenario is possible — let alone likely.
Imaginary goals have one great advantage: we can declare victory and leave, secure in the liklihood that this improbable threat has been averted.
The End of the Insurgency
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Part V of this series provoked many emails requesting more symptoms showing the decline of the State (DOTS) in America. I wish all the questions I received were so easy to answer. This essay will give some general background and a specific example. The ur-text for DOTS is Martin van Creveld’s The Rise and Decline of the State. [DNI Editor's note: See also van Creveld's "The Fate of the State"] He gives vast evidence of DOTS in America, such as the shifting of core functions like primary education and security from public to private entities - either for profit companies or non-government organizations (NGO’s).
The privatization of education is a major media story, especially efforts by the government to resist the rise of home teaching and for-profit schools. The privatization of security has occurred more quietly and is perhaps more significant. Private security detectives/guards outnumber police in America by approximately 1.1 million to 800 thousand, and their numbers are growing faster. The total number of private guards does not even include in-house guards, such as for companies and schools - nor mercs, such as those Blackwater brought in to guard the mansions of New Orleans following Katrina.
These are just the first symptoms of America’s DOTS. The State’s loss of power means not just diminished functions but an overall loss of authority. For example, generations of lies have eroded the credibility of America’s government - and its replacement by NGO’s as reliable sources of information and analysis. We see this today as Americans seek to learn about events in the Iraq War.
Even pro-war groups seek alternative sources of information to official reports and the establishment media. Hence the development of a cottage-industry of privately supported bloggers reporting from Iraq, such as Michael Yon and Bill Roggio.
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