Experts’ views about the recent fighting in Basra

(#9 in a series)   The recent events in Basra provide a test, allowing comparison of a war blogger’s analysis vs. that of experts.  The previous post showed Bill Roggio’s view of the Basra fighting (as a sample of war-bloggers’ reporting).  This post looks at both mainstream reporting and expert analysis.  In the next few days or weeks, when the dust settles, we will see whose analysis was most accurate. 

Note that expert analysis tends to be more tentative, with emphasis on the limits of the available data, and the complex, fluid nature of the situation.  War blogger reports tend (a broad generalization, not always correct) to display both certainty and simplicity (sometimes approaching cartoon-like).

“ANALYSIS-Iraqi crackdown backfires, strengthens Sadrists“, Reuters  (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:

Gareth Stansfield, a professor of Middle East politics at the University of Exeter in England, said Maliki had staked his political credibility on the show of force in Basra and lost.  “Maliki’s credibility is shot at this point. He really thought his security forces could really do this. But he’s failed,” he said.

“reports of a truce, some reflections“, Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark  (31 March 2008) - Excerpt:

Different voices discussing the events in Basra

Google shows dozens or hundreds of websites with folks discussing the recent events in Basra.  On one level that is good, helping us collectively absorb and digest what is happening in this war.  On another it might hurt us more than it helps, as much of the discussion is by folks with little knowledge of Iraq — its players and dynamics.  This is characteristic of modern America, from the upper echelons down to the grass roots.

The fragmentary accounts we have of the pre-war decision-making suggest that the discussions were closely held among senior decision-makers, with little input from the professional staff of DoD, State, and the intelligence community — the people who have actual knowledge of and experience in the Middle East.  Looking back in history, where we can see more clearly, the Pentagon Papers show the same dynamic at work in the Vietnam War.  As the time for major decisions grew near, the decision-makers excluded their supporting staff — relying on their personal body of experience and knowledge.  Unfortunately, that was inadequate for the task — as we learned to our great sorrow.

With these lessons learned, perhaps we can do better in the future.  For example, the Internet gives acess to several good sources of information about the fighting in Basra.  Here are a few that I find valuable, in no particular order.  Please tell us in the comments about sites you find of use!

I.  “Who are the Iraq Security Forces“, W. Patrick Lang (Colonel, US Army, retired), posted at Sic Semper Tyrannis (26 March 2008)

So, there is fighting in Basra among the Shia?  What a surprise!  A showdown there between forces of the Mahdi Army and the rest has been “in the cards” for some time.  The MSM talks as though the “Iraqi Security Forces” are something other than representatives of militia anti Sadrist forces among the Shia.  That is not the case.  The security forces really represent the power of some of the Shia parties/militias being used in this case against the Sadrists.  There is an ongoing struggle among the major Shia factions in Iraq.  One of these is the Mahdi Army of Moqtada al-Sadr.  Others include the Dawa allies of Prime Ministers Maliki, the al-Hakim faction (SIIC), the Badr Force (generally allied with Hakim) and Fadila in the Basra area.

Need a score card?  Well…  the “security forces” are full of Badr Force militia men.  These people belong to an organization that was raised originally by Iran to fight against IRAQ.  They have been recruited into the “security forces” in large numbers.  They intend to break the Mahdi Army if they can and the US seems to approve of that idea.

Reinforcements have been sent from Karbala to Basra.  Karbala is virtually ruled by the Badr Force. 

The US has been treasuring the idea that the apparatus of the Iraqi state is other than a congeries of militia factions and parties.  Once again the untruth of that is exposed.

A solution to 4GW - the introduction

 We now have an adequate basis upon which to develop a solution for 4GW (at least, a “Mark I” version).  Three recent books provide the last missing pieces of this puzzle:

• If We Can Keep It by Chet Richards  (aka IWCKI)
• Brave New War by John Robb  (BNW)
• The Changing Face of War by Martin van Creveld

None of these are long (IWCKI is only 152 pages) or inaccessible to the general reader, as they are clearly conceived and well-written.  These works build on the foundation of many other books and articles since the study of 4GW began (using an arbitrarily point) with publication of Into the Fourth Generation by William Lind et al (1989), and Martin van Creveld’s Transformation of War (1991) and The Rise and Decline of the State (1999).

We must define the problem before attempting to describe a solution.  Thomas Kuhn described a paradigm as shared body of knowledge, definitions, and assumptions, allowing communication among workers in a specific field, and focusing their research on agreed-upon key questions.  Modern war lacks a consensus on these things; hence the debate frequently devolves into cacophony.  Even the “community” talking about 4GW lacks a tight paradigm, and the discussion seems to be fragmenting with the multiplication of war’s generations (5th gen, 6th gen) and criticisms — often quite valid – of 4GW as (in my words) a hall of mirrors.   (See this post on DNI for more on the definition of 4GW)

This might result from the conceptual basis of 4GW having been ripped from the context established in van Creveld’s writings, without regard for the distinction he draws between the broad class of non-Trin conflicts and war (the latter being a subset of the former).  Can we build a more-or-less agreed upon framework to facilitate discussion?  (Paradigms are conceptual tools, not miniature versions of reality)

Theories about 4GW are not yet like the Laws of Thermodynamics

One of the baleful influences on the 4GW analysis is the science of Psychohistory developed by Hari Seldon, capable of accurately predicting history (as described in the Foundation novels of Isaac Asimov).  Social science “laws” in the real world are just heuristics, generalities not to be confused with the Laws of Thermodynamics.  This is especially true in military theory.  For example, Clausewitz’s On War opens with some general rules (e.g., the relationship between offense and defense), which he then elaborates with great detail but no certainty (having experience at war, he knew the limits of theories about people).

This is important, as progress in understanding 4GW requires distilling out more of these general relationships from the mass of 20th century history.  For example, in January 2007 I postulated that insurgencies come in two flavors, depending on the role of foreigners.  Chet Richards refined this differentialtion of insurgency types into …

• Classical insurgency: a revolution, in other words, in which a sizable fraction of the population opposes what they consider to be an illegitimate or oppressive government, as the American colonies did in 1776-1781. The goal of the insurgent groups may be either to take control of the central government or to achieve independence for a portion of the population.
• War of national liberation: in which a sizable fraction of the people in a country throws out an occupying foreign power, as Vietnam did to us in 1965-1975.

From the Introduction to If We Can Keep It (IWCKI)

ABCDs for today: About Blitzkrieg, COIN, and Diplomacy

Here and here I discussed our tactical retreat in Anbar Province of Iraq.  Dan Tdaxp raises an interesting and valuable question (here) about this:  what does “retreat” mean in 4GW?

The previous generations of war occured in physical space.  We plot their course on maps, using lines and arrows.  A  3GW “retreat” means movement away from geographic objectives. 

Can we show the course of the Iraq War on a map?  Not easily, as 4GW occurs in social space (aka human terrain).  For example, we speak of the “moral high ground”.  Also note the growing role of anthropologists (e.g. Kilcullen) and the social sciences (e.g., in FM 3-24) in counter-insurgency (COIN) theory and practice.  Update:  Ralph Peter’s article “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations” (Parameters, Spring 2000), esp. his challenge at the end, is a poorly-recognised milestone of 4GW analysis –reintroducing the social sciences to the art of 4GW. 

In 4GW “retreat” means movement away from objectives expressed in people terms:  building institutions, changing loyalties, motivating friends and de-motivating opponents.  Traditionally these are strategic considerations — diplomatic maneuvers, the decisive factors in many wars.  Our alliance with France made victory possible for the American Revolution.  Gaining support in Britan led to the rapid collapse of Britain’s will to fight after Yorktown and their generous terms in the Treaty of Paris (1783).  The Union inflamed Britain’s hatred of slavery to keep the UK out of the Civil War, a necessary ingredient for victory.

The Constitution: wonderful, if we can keep it

Many reviews of books about public policy give the impression that the reviewer went directly to the last chapter, which describes the author’s recommendations.  Going to the good stuff works when reading Penthouse, but not Shakespeare (Hamlet:  everyone dies, so it is a tragedy).  The path to understanding the recommendations is a book’s content.  The destination may be wonderful, but is the path like a Roman road, or just two ruts in the dirt?

Chet Richard’s new book If We Can We Can Keep It recommends a new geopolitical strategy for America.  It is a heavy work.  Not in length (if a Nobel Prize is awarded to the book in 2008 with the greatest content/length ratio, Richards should start writing his acceptance speech).  It is heavy with detailed, clear, and innovative reasoning.

It deserves a review (I’ll do one eventually).  First, however, we should see the context - which tells us if the book is important.  Where is his book in the larger flow of thought about 4GW?

The art of war advances, like science, in two ways.  First and most common, are tool-driven revolutions.  Most of the progress in science has been from development of new tools:  from the telescope and microscope to X-ray diffraction (which revealed the DNA helix).  The same is obviously true of war:  iron, steel, breeding larger horses, the stirrup, gunpowder, internal combustion engines … and atomic weapons.

Second, there are concept-driven revolutions — famously described by Thomas Kuhn in his great book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (a must-read for anyone seeking to understand modern military theory and practice).  In science they are often personalized, as in the revolutions of Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, Einstein, and Freud.  (Some, like quantum-mechanics, are associated with no one man.) ***

So it is with the military arts.  New concepts of warfare can be revolutionary (in several senses).  The feudal knight was supreme in Europe until the rediscovery that a body of men on foot could stand against cavalry.  Napoleon’s armies had the same technology as their foes, which Napoleon repeatedly crushed until they adopted his new ideas of organization and deployment.  Sometimes new ideas require new technology, such as the combination of German infiltration tactics and the internal combustion engine to yield blitzkrieg.

How the Iraq and Vietnam wars are mirror images of each other

Chet Richards (Colonel, USAF, retired) noted the strong parallels between our tactics in Vietnam then and Iraq now.  Now let’s look through the other end of the telescope.  How does our experience in Vietnam differ from that in Iraq?  I believe that in one key aspect of the war our actions in Iraq are a mirror image of those in Vietnam.

In Vietnam we sought to maintain a friendly government in South Vietnam, preventing its overthrow by insurgents or conquest by the Army of North Vietnam.  Simple, clear goals - allowing relatively easy definition of progress.  Our enemy, having read Sun Tzu, defeated us by attacking our weakest point.  Not our invincible military apparatus — undefeated on the battlefield – but the American people’s commitment to this foreign war. 

In 1964 Johnson campaigned as the peace candidate against the warmonger Goldwater – while his officials prepared to massively escalate the war in 1965.  His election victory was great, winning 44 states and 486 to 52 in the Electoral College.  But his mandate did not include a Southeast Asian war, especially a war whose connection with our national security was vague, despite the war’s great cost in money and lives.  After four years of war his Administration collapsed amidst the fires of the Tet Offensive. 

As it turned out, these concerns about the irrelevance of the war were correct, as our defeat in Vietnam had few long-term consequences.  (As this Wall Street Journal op-ed shows, three decades later some remain unable to see this simple story, still re-fighting the war like Confederate vets bemoaning Pickett’s Charge.)

Bush avoided Johnson’s error in the 2004 election by clearly promising a long, difficult war in Iraq.  The Administration and Congress have clearly stated our objectives (see here for a full list of our goals and benchmarks).  This is textbook perfect strategy. 

But - unlike Vietnam — our actions in Iraq seem disconnected from our goals.  Hence the long, confused debate about “winning.”  Are we winning or losing?  How will we know when we have won?  Here we repeat — in a different way – the fatal error that doomed our efforts in Vietnam.  Confusion must result when tactics and strategy clash, weakening public support for the war. 

Three blind men examine the Iraq Elephant

First in another series of Iraq situation reports. 

As with the fable about the blind men and the elephant (see here for several versions), we can look at Iraq from different perspectives.  Each gives different insights.

One day, a rajah’s son asked, “Father, what is reality?”

“An excellent question, my son.  Come, we will go to the marketplace.” 

So the rajah and his son went outside and mounted their royal elephant.  When they got to the marketplace, the rajah commanded, “Bring me 3 blind men.”  When the blind men arrived, the rajah commanded, “Place one blind man at the elephant’s tusk, one at the elephant’s leg and one at the elephant’s tail.”  When that was done, the rajah said, “Describe the elephant to me, blind men.”

The man at the tusk said, “It’s like a spear.” The man at the leg said, “It’s like a tree.” The man at the tail said, “It’s like a rope.”

As the men started to argue, the rajah said to his son, “Reality, my son, is the elephant.  And we are all blind men.”

Many optimists about the gain confidence from reports by those who have served with US forces in Iraq, including the “war bloggers”.   But the reports of strangers in a strange land - especially people with guns occupying foreign land, knowing neither the language nor the culture - must be handled with care.  As told in another version of this story…

One day six wise, blind elephants were discussing what humans were like. Failing to agree, they decided to determine what humans were like by direct experience.  The first wise, blind elephant felt the human, and declared, “Humans are flat.”  The other wise, blind elephants similarly felt the human and agreed that humans are flat.   (Both these stories are from here.)

For another perspective we can ask a wise man what we are doing in Iraq.  Such as Chet Richards (Colonel, USAF, retired), who says…

General Petraeus has abandoned the counterinsurgency manual in favor of the tactics which served us so well in Vietnam: massed bombings of civilian areas, search-and-destroy sweeps, and funding Popular Force militias.   {note additional detail on this in the comments}

Search and destroy sweeps

DoD Death Spiral - the US Navy version

The following article not only provides an excellent example of the Defense Death Spiral (see here for a description), but also illustrates other important points.

1. The mainstream media report these problems in the perky, amnesiac fashion of a fool — as if each time they discover the problem it is an original insight.  Since journals are, in general, not fools we see that the Defense apparatus is not the only American institution which has serious structural flaws.  (This article from Proceedings is a welcome contrast)
2. The mainstream media tend to report these stories in a stylized manner.  Problem.  Brief quote from iconoclastic outsider.  Hint at simplistic solution.  Even a brief look at the professional military literature would typically show a long history of articles about this problem, giving both analysis and proposed solutions.  The media accounts are therefore misleading, as the problem is not with diagnosis but the structural barriers preventing implementation of a cure.
3. Look at the series of links in my articles about these issues, such as the Defense Death Spiral (here) or the military’s difficulty recruiting and retaining good people (here).  Note the number of articles about these — usually of high quality — in the Army’s Parameter’s, the Navy’s Proceedings, or the Marine Corps Gazette.  Usually by current or former serving officers.  Whatever the cause of these problems, it is clearly not with the quality of the people we have in uniform.  They have proved competent both at recognition and analysis of their organizations’ ills, and recommending a range of solutions.  By elimination, that leave as root causes some combination of the overall structure of DoD, the wider Washington system of which it is a part, and our senior civilian and military leaders.
4. If you are interested in these matters, consider subscribing to one or more of the various professional publications of the US armed forces, such as Parameters, Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, and the Marine Corps Gazette.

Back to the story at hand about the US Navy’s Death Spiral.  Please share your comments by posting below (brief and relevant, please), or email me at fabmaximus at hotmail dot com (note the spam-protected spelling).

Recommendation to read: “Is Warfighting Enough” by Richards and Vandergriff

“Is Warfighting Enough?” by Chet Richards (Colonel, USAF, retired) and Don Vandergriff (Major, USA, retired) — now available online in the February 2008 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette.

The shelves of many libraries groan under the weight of articles calling for new ways of analyzing geopolitical and military issues.  In four pages this article shows how the theories of John Boyd can provide this, which we desperately need.  Instead of yet another analysis of 4GW, this sketches out solutions – practical methods for building forces capable of fighting 4GW’s, and how to use them.

Another valuable aspect of this article:  both Richards and Vandergriff are excellent writers, able to express complex reasoning in a clear and brief fashion.

About the The Marine Corps Gazette

There are many good periodicals about modern warfare.  I consider The Marine Corps Gazette to be one of the best.  Since the publication in 1989 of the Lind et al article Into the Fourth Generation it has been in the forefront of coverage of and discussion about the paradoxes and challenges of 4GW.  The Gazette is available to members and subscribers only.  If you’re eligible, join!  If you’re not, subscribe!  Click here for details.

For more on this subject

• For more about the Adaptive Leaders Course:  Recommended reading: transforming the Army, the hard way
• The Adaptive Leadership Symposium will be held on 19 March 2008 at Greenville SC.  Download the conference brochure here (234 kb PDF).
• For a links to the online works of Donald Vandergriff:  The Essential 4GW reading list: Chapter Two, Donald Vandergriff.
• For links to the online works of John Boyd see the DNI archive page, which also lists books about Boyd and his thinking.
• Boyd’s theories are explained in more detail in Chet Richard’s book Certain to Win.

Are war games a competitive edge of conventional forces vs. non-state 4GW foes?

I recommend reading the threat on military simulations that started here and has moved over to the DNI blog.  Some of the participants have considerable experience in this field.  Here are a few thoughts about the value of military simulations, esp. as a tool to accelerate the transformation of conventional military forces — their adaption to an age in which 4GW is the dominant form of war.

Simulations allow organizations to test themselves in a changing world, against potential enemies.  As discussed previously, they are an antidote — perhaps the antidote — to victory disease.  But only if the designers, operators, and participants allow for the good guys to fail — and if senior decision-makers listen to the results (more on these considerations in the next post in this series).

The roots of military simulations are lost in history.  Kriegsspiel, German for war game, was developed in 1824 to train Prussian officers.  The US military use of simulations has accelerated since the early applications of the 1950’s.  The Millennium Challenge exercise cost $250 million, the largest of the hundreds of simulation projects run in recent years.  This history shows that simulations have the potential to force innovation by highlighting weaknesses in doctrine and force structure, but can just as powerfully serve to re-enforce the status quo.

Martin van Creveld has a few things to say about war games.  Considering his track record, I suggest that we listen closely.

Diagnosing the Eagle, Chapter III — reclaiming the Constitution

Chapter II began with a question about America’s strengths by Chet Richards, which he concluded with this assertion (Chet runs the Defense and the National Interest website, now a blog, and writes at his personal blog Certain to Win):

So my hypothesis is that as long as we tend to the health of our constitutional free enterprise system, our future as a prosperous nation is assured. 

A comforting thought, but perhaps operationally impossible.  In July 2006 I wrote Forecast: Death of the American Constitution, showing that the Constitution is dying and explaining why we do not notice.  In brief:  once we no longer revere the Constitution, or even know what it says, the Constitutional political order in America has ended.  For the past few generations we have slowly drifted towards a different and historically less radical political regime, one of passive subjects (i.e., consumers) and ruling elites.

Although our political mechanisms as yet appear unchanged, our move away from a free enterprise system is more obvious.  To mention just two symptoms…

Government regulation benefiting large and politically-powerful enterprises over smaller ones. 

Adoption of a “heads we win - tails you lose” financial system.  That is, our elites invest under a system of privatized profits, socialized losses.

As a result of these and other changes, wealth and income concentrates in few hands over time.  The middle class has survived the past few decades by borrowing, and their day of reckoning now approaches.

So I will re-phrase Chet’s question:  can we re-embrace the Constitution?  This post attempts to answer Chet using excerpts from a book I strongly recommend reading, and consider one of the best I have ever read:  The Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom (1987).  America is an experiment in applied philosophy, and our mistakes have their roots in these theories about the nature of men and the best regime.  The first half of Closing is easy and fun to read, with observations that will strike most readers strongly.  The second is more difficult — and more rewarding for those seeking understanding of our society.  After reading it you might see many things differently, and find evidence of its accuracy in the daily news. 

The next chapters in this series provide different perspectives on our situation.

A Summary of my argument

Diagnosing the Eagle, Chapter II — book recommendations for 2008

The following note by Chet Richards was extracted from the comments on An important thing to remember as we start a New Year (Chet is Editor of Defense and the National Interest and writes at his blog):

Could you comment on what it is that gives the United States its enormous competitive strength? 

Let me throw out an hypothesis:  The competitive strength of any organization depends primarily upon its ability to inspire and then harmonize the creativity and initiative of its people in order to accomplish their common goals.

In the United States, the highest-level expression of our common goals is the Constitution.  In the United States, the free enterprise system is our mechanism for stoking and harmonizing creativity and initiative.  In addition to our legal system, other infrastructure, local market size, and access to capital, the US remains the easiest country in the developed world to start (or stop) a business.

So my hypothesis is that as long as we tend to the health of our constitutional free enterprise system, our future as a prosperous nation is assured. 

I agree with this, but the Constitution is not a complete answer to Chet’s question.  If the Iraq people voted to adopt the Constitution, would Iraq be on the road to success?  Also, we still have the Constitution — so our current ills must have other roots.

Diagnosing the eagle, chapter I — the housing bust

Something is wrong with America, rendering our society incapable of connecting effectively to reality.  The late USAF Colonel John Boyd described this as a process:  Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act.  For a description of the OODA loop see this; for a discussion of Orientation see Chet Richard’s new blog post.   Who can tell what has caused this social illness, a form of cultural Alzheimer’s?  The symptoms appear in many aspects of our national public policy — collective action in critical areas such as energy, geopolitics, and management of our economy.

We find it difficult to recognize large problems until they are upon us, and to discern causes and effects.  Worse, often we cannot weigh the various short- and long-term factors to rationally decide how to respond, so we choose seemingly easy and fast solutions without bothering to perform the necessary research and analysis.  And, perhaps as a result of this flawed process, we frequently find ourselves unable to competently implement whatever course of action we choose. 

Rather than provide a theoretical analysis, I’ll show a few case studies.  In Chapter I we will look at the housing cycle.  Just a normal business cycle, although driven to amazing heights by a combination of factors — all noted at the time, with these warnings ignored by both our ruling elites and the citizenry:

• artificially low interest rates (Fed policy),
• ambitious public policy seeking to increase homeownership (esp among minority and lower income households),
• irresponsibly slack regulation of lenders, and
• ill-considered financial innovations.

Now we face the downcycle, inevitably long and hard proportionate to the extraordinary upcycle.  Rather than take the time to assemble experts to do the necessary research and prepare recommendations, our activists and politicians immediately reach for quack nostrums — which almost certainly will have unpleasant long-term effects.  Rather than rehash all this, here are a few links so you can read and decide for yourself. 

As usual in America,the important initiatives are bipartisan.

Arrows in the Eagle’s claw - about 4GW analysts

This series describes the various types of solutions to modern warfare, herein called fourth generation warfare (4GW).  It sketches out a typology, showing the five types of writings about 4GW, their relationship to one another and their relative potential.

• Analysts - the foundation of the pyramid.  All solutions rely on sound analysis.
• Visionaries -bold imaginations seek solutions to 4GW, outside of the confines of real-world constraints.
• Things, applying America’s trump cards — technology and logistics — to defeat 4GW opponents.
• Ideas, solutions based on new ways of thinking to defeat new modes of war.
• People, solutions based on new ways of leading people:  selecting, training, organizing, and promoting them.

See Chapter I for a summary of this schema.  Chapter II considers those works providing analysis of 4GW.  4GW analysts have drawn on a range of resources, including history, military theory, and the social sciences.  Their work is foundational to the development of solutions, for nothing can be done except by luck without a deep understanding of factors such as…

• our situation (strengths, weaknesses, goals, etc),
• the other players on the world stage (both state and non-state actors),
• and the almost infinite range of scenarios possible in the near and far future. 

Since most of those writing about 4GW combine analysis and recommendations, included in this group are those whose work focuses on more on description than prescription.  Any simple categorization is somewhat arbitrary when applied to individuals.

Some highlights of 4GW analysis to date

There are too many brilliant works in this literature to adequately cover in a one post, but here are a few highlights.

Least we forget: lessons for us from the Battle of Ia Drang

In November 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) fought, in the Ia Drang Valley of Vietnam, the first major battle between the North Vietnamese and American armies. This marked our transition from our role as advisers to direct combatants. After the battle lessons were drawn by both sides that determined the course of the war. With the clarity of hindsight we can see whose analysis proved better.

Forty-two years later we have again committed our Army and Marines to fight in a distant land. Again we have come to an inflection point, at which all sides devise plans for the future. Least we forgot, Ia Drang holds profound lessons for us.

The quotes in this post are all from one of the great works about the Vietnam War: We Were Soldiers Once… and Young, by Lt. General Harold G. Moore (Ret.) and Joseph L. Galloway. I strongly recommend reading it. Here is the Wikipedia entry on the battle.

Ia Drang tested the new concept of air assault. Now we could insert troops into a distant area, supply and extract them by helicopter. During that four day “test” 234 American men died. “That is more Americans than were killed in any regiment, North or South, at he Battle of Gettysburg, and far more than were killed in combat in the entire Persian Gulf War.” Both sides drew optimistic conclusions from the result.

Arrows in the Eagle’s claw - solutions to 4GW

This series describes the various types of solutions to modern warfare, herein called fourth generation warfare (4GW).  It will attempt to show their relationship to one another and their relative potential.  4GW appears to be the dominant form of warfare in the 21st century, so mastery of it might prove necessary for America’s prosperity or even survival.  This is a topology, a wide perspective view of writings about 4GW.  Future chapters will examine these divisions in more detail.

Analysts – the foundation of the pyramid

This first class of work provides analysis, drawing on a diverse range of resources including history, military theory, and the social sciences.  This is foundational to the development of solutions, for nothing can be done except by luck without a deep understanding of

• our situation (strengths, weaknesses, goals, etc),
• the other players on the world stage (both state and non-state actors),
• and the almost infinite range of scenarios possible in the near and far future. 

Since everyone working with 4GW does some combination of analysis and recommendations, I include in this group those whose work focuses on more on description than prescription.  Applied to individuals, any simple categorization is somewhat arbitrary.

Readers of journals in this field — such as  DNI, Parameters, or the Marine Corps Gazette — will see that this category of work is by far the largest both in volume and number of writers.  It includes, just to name a few,  Martin van Creveld, David Kilcullen, Chet Richards, and John Robb.

Visionaries — another important component of the foundation

America’s Most Dangerous Enemy

Summary:  This essay examines the most dangerous enemies of America.  Two little known dangers appear far most serious than the usual suspects.  Appropriate responses are discussed.

Threat definition is the key phase when developing a grand strategy. Especially today, as America faces many dangerous enemies.  Who are our most dangerous foes?

China

Billions of people, a rapidly growing economy that will inevitably replace America in both economic and geopolitical importance. One of our largest creditors, its technological theft and unfair trade practices are destroying America’s industry. A military confrontation over Taiwan is inevitable in the near future.

Islamofascism

This mutant version of Islam combines traditional Islam, nostalgia for a long-gone age of Muslim supremacy, and Fascism. Motivated by hatred of western culture, if not stopped it will control not only the vital Middle East oil producers, but also important States such as Pakistan and Indonesia. Large minority populations of Muslims will destabilize other States (e.g., India and the EU). Even small Moslem enclaves, such as those in the US, can act as fifth columns.

The “Gap” Nations

As Thomas Barnett explained in his March 2003 Esquire article:  ”Disconnectedness defines danger. “

… show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and — most important — the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. … My list of real trouble for the world in the 1990s, today, and tomorrow, starting in our own backyard: (Haiti, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, former Yugoslavia, Congo, Rwanda/Burundi, Angola, South Africa, Israel-Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Indonesia).

However terrifying you find these foes, we face two much greater dangers.

I.  Paranoia

The Myth of Grand Strategy

Summary: What would a grand strategy for America look like? This critiques our current policies and Barnett’s proposals in terms our limited wisdom and power. It ends with recommendations for design of a modest but functional strategy for America.

The world is in turmoil. America has wealth and power like no previous nation. We only lack a grand strategy to guide us. Fortunately we have no lack of Grand Strategists recommending that America exert its strength to reshape the world, and providing a vision to guide us.

“Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been trying to come up with an operating theory of the world — and a military strategy to accompany it.
Now there’s a leading contender. It involves identifying the problem parts of the world and aggressively shrinking them.”
Introduction to “The Pentagon’s New Map“, Thomas P. M. Barnett, Esquire, March 2003