Many reviews of books about public policy give the impression that the reviewer went directly to the last chapter, which describes the author’s recommendations. Going to the good stuff works when reading Penthouse, but not Shakespeare (Hamlet: everyone dies, so it is a tragedy). The path to understanding the recommendations is a book’s content. The destination may be wonderful, but is the path like a Roman road, or just two ruts in the dirt?
Chet Richard’s new book If We Can We Can Keep It recommends a new geopolitical strategy for America. It is a heavy work. Not in length (if a Nobel Prize is awarded to the book in 2008 with the greatest content/length ratio, Richards should start writing his acceptance speech). It is heavy with detailed, clear, and innovative reasoning.
It deserves a review (I’ll do one eventually). First, however, we should see the context - which tells us if the book is important. Where is his book in the larger flow of thought about 4GW?
The art of war advances, like science, in two ways. First and most common, are tool-driven revolutions. Most of the progress in science has been from development of new tools: from the telescope and microscope to X-ray diffraction (which revealed the DNA helix). The same is obviously true of war: iron, steel, breeding larger horses, the stirrup, gunpowder, internal combustion engines … and atomic weapons.
Second, there are concept-driven revolutions — famously described by Thomas Kuhn in his great book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (a must-read for anyone seeking to understand modern military theory and practice). In science they are often personalized, as in the revolutions of Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, Einstein, and Freud. (Some, like quantum-mechanics, are associated with no one man.) ***
So it is with the military arts. New concepts of warfare can be revolutionary (in several senses). The feudal knight was supreme in Europe until the rediscovery that a body of men on foot could stand against cavalry. Napoleon’s armies had the same technology as their foes, which Napoleon repeatedly crushed until they adopted his new ideas of organization and deployment. Sometimes new ideas require new technology, such as the combination of German infiltration tactics and the internal combustion engine to yield blitzkrieg.
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