You can end our war in Afghanistan

We have reached an important moment in the Afghanistan War, a point where citizen involvement can make a difference.  If we speak out.  And success here might show our strength, and lead to greater victories hereafter.

Hawks usually give two justifications for the war:

1. to prevent another 9-11, and
2. to build a stable and “good” Afghanistan (good being defined in many ways — cherishing human rights, prosperous, democratic, etc).

The first of these is the Big Lie.  Afghanistan had little or no role in 9-11.  Whatever we do in Afghanistan does not prevent another 9-11.

(a)  The 9-11 attack was planned in Karachi, Kuala Lumpur, and Hamburg.

(b)  The most important and relevant training of the 9-11 terrorists took place in the US.

(c)  The Afghanistan camps primarily trained fighters against the Northern Alliance.  The training they provided for 9-11 could easily have been done elsewhere.  For more on this see “The ’safe haven’ myth“, Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, 18 August 2009, or “Who’s Afraid of A Terrorist Haven?, Paul R. Pillar, op-ed in the Washtington Post, 16 September 2009.

The second reason is so absurd that it needs no rebuttal, as most Americans reject it as either impossible or not worth the cost in blood and money.

This big lie is the keystone of the Afghanistan War.  Remove it and public support for the war will collapse.  No war can be waged by America without a high degree of public support.

Start today

Tell your friends and relatives.  Write your newspapers.  Post comments on blogs.  Speak up!  So far all the passion has been by the pro-war advocates, like Ralph Peters (see here for examples).  When the rest of us speak up with equal passion the war will end.

Are we blind, or just incurious about important news?

The strongest impression I get from reading our major news media is their lack of curiosity.   If they were to see an elephant walking down Constitution Avenue, they would remark briefly about it before returning to more important things.  The latest jokes about Palin’s children, or Michelle Obama’s sleeveless dresses.

One of the most interesting non-stories is the rise of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).  Established in February 2007, it rapidly became a major player in the military policy debate.  What supporters have lifted it so quickly to such prominence?  What does this tell us about Obama’s national security plans?  (Note:  The CNAS website lists the organizations that support it (here), but of course with no indications of the individuals who pull the strings.}

Consider this article about their June conference Striking a Balance:  ”One-Sided COIN – The military-industrial complex surges Washington“, Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, The American Conservative, 1 August 2009.  This is real reporting, preparing the reader to understand future news.  Excerpt:

You know it’s not going to be a typical Washington think-tank event when, upon entering the gilded doors of the Willard InterContinental Hotel, you are greeted by a peppy female soldier in an Army service uniform bedecked with medals. “Welcome, are you here for CNAS?”

For the Center for a New American Security, the June 11 annual meeting was about doing things big — broadcasting to the swelling Washington national-security establishment that CNAS is a major player; that there is but a sliver of daylight between its civilian-policy mission and that of the U.S. military. Both are working symbiotically to make their vision the only remedy for the young Obama administration’s foreign-policy challenges.

Here was a heady mix of Army brass, Navy officers in their starched whites, and soldiers in digital camo networking among the dark suits and smart skirts of the civilian elite. Defense contractors, lobbyists, analysts, journalists, administration reps, Hill staff—1,400 of the “best and brightest,” seeing and being seen.

Gen. David Petraeus—no one could have better sanctified this event save Obama himself—stepped to the dais. He called CNAS “a true force.” … In June 2007, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton stood on the same platform, delivering the keynote speech at CNAS’s glittering launch. There the center planted its first marker and was unofficially identified as Clinton’s national security team in waiting. …

At the top {of CNAS} is retired Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, who served in the Gulf War and Iraq before working directly for Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon. … Then there’s the more nuanced but equally ubiquitous David Kilcullen …

That just sets the stage. The real story is the number of CNAS associates in Obama’s national security apparatus, all gung ho for lots of foreign wars. Were you expecting change?  Think about that when reading this list…

Does America have clear vision? Here’s an “eye chart” for our minds.

One symptom of a nation’s broken observation-orientation-decision-action loop (OODA loop) is a disconnect of our national dialog from reality.  IMO this is the strongest evidence of America’s dysfunction.  A broken OODA loop means that we can neither recognize nor prioritize problems.  If uncorrected, we cannot effectively fix those problems that we do see.  We become a blind giant.

Wars magnify social prolbems, making them easier to see.  So it is with our broken OODA loop.  Today’s post discusses one example of this, posing it in question form.

Discussion of counter-insurgency theory has dominated our view of the Iraq War.  The role of well-known military natmes – such as General Petreaus, David Kilcullen, John Nagl — are associated with COIN.  FM 3-24 (see the PDF) was the most-discussed doctrinal change.  Military discussion sites — such as the small wars council — featured vast numbers of papers and comment threads on its intricacies and application.

The key question was seldom asked, and IMO never answered.  Let’s take a crack at it today.

Did COIN — in theory or practice – have any substantial effect on the Iraq War?

Chet Richards (Colonel, USAF, retired), stated what should be considered the null hypothesis:

An expert explains why we must fight in Afghanistan

In this post an expert in the Af-Pak region explains why America must fight in Afghanistan.  It’s valuable as the rationale of the war has received far too little discussion.  For professional reasons this person remains anonymous. 

This subject is of extreme importance to America.  The Af-Pak war may come to dominate the attention of the Obama Administration, as it did the Bush Jr. team — draining energy and political capital needed to fight the economic crisis and implement their ambitious domestic policy agenda.  That could have sad consequences, since America has a long-deferred list of vital public policy reforms.  The Boomers retirement, starting in the next decade, will complicate these both politically and financially.

Why are we in Afghanistan?

FM, round #1

Do the following statements seem sensible?

“The mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda and other transnational extremists. That’s what it had become before the operations conducted in the wake of 9/11. Al Qaeda wants to carry out further attacks on the US and our allies, and we need to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks.”

— From “The Battle Ahead – General Petraeus on US Strategy”, Ralph Peters, op-ed in the New York Post, 19 May 2009

“Failure in Afghanistan would mean not only a possible return of pre-9/11 safe havens, but also a sharp blow to the prestige of the United States and its allies.”

— “Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan“, David Kilcullen et al, Center for a New American Security, 10 June 2009

Both of these are absurd, IMO. 

1. We’re supposed to spend billions of dollars and nobody knows how many American lives to prevent “a sharp blow to the prestige of the United States and its allies”? 
2. Is there any evidence that the al Qaeda “safe havens” in Afghanistan were relevant to 9-11?

The Afghanistan camps primarily trained fighters against the Northern Alliance. The most important training of the 9-11 terrorists took place in the US.  Whatever minimal additional training was required could have been done anywhere in the wilds of the Western US.   It’s easy to camp there for a month and see nobody, if you stay off the trails.  The Forest Services and Bureau of Land Management have a small force of professional staff to patrol the vast areas under their supervision.

Reply, round #1

The 9-11 hijackers received several months’ training in Kandahar, which was where Bin Laden had set up one of his training camps after we bombed the one in Khost.  Of course, as you note, such a camp can be run anywhere there is no government presence.  I don’t think you could realistically set up a hidden, undiscoverable training camp in the U.S., although you could wander around for a long time and never see a cop.

James Bond is not just our hero, but the model for our geopolitical strategy

I enjoyed Ian Fleming’s books about James Bond, and some of the movies too (esp. Casino Royale).  But should we base our geopolitical strategyon fielding teams of “00″ agents (and special operators) to kill our enemies?  Will this make us safer, or make more likely what we most wish to avoid?

Consider this:

1. Many (most?) nations have used assassination in exceptional circumstances.
2. Some nations have made occasional use of assassination (e.g., our Phoenix Program in Vietnam).
3. Some nations have made extensive — even routine — use of assassination (e.g., the USSR, Israel).

Since our entry into WWII, and esp during the Cold War, America moved from group 1 to group 2.  Now we are moving from group 2 to group 3.  This post discusses the history of assassination as a geopolitical tool (i.e., by government against foreign enemies), how we are making more use of it, and what this might mean for America.

Contents

1. History of assassination
2. Today’s news
3. Implications of routine assassination
4. Legalities
5. Recommended sources  for an introduction to this subject
6. Afterword and where to go for more information

(1)  History of assassination

Assassination as a tool of statecraft or war is nothing new.  In Chapter 13 of The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote:

A moment of truth about Iraq; apologies quickly follow – please forget this ASAP!

Summary:  David Kilcullen and Spencer Ackerman provide a rare moment of truthful insight about the Iraq War.  Such things are considered inappropriate for public consumption in 21st century America (they disturb the proles), so both ask us to ignore their impolitic remarks and get on with the long war.

America’s expedition to Iraq will give future historians many moments of glee amidst their somber contemplation of a war costing so much, yielding so little, yet declared victorious by so many.  One such lighter moment occurred this week.  In this, as in so many key moments about the Iraq War, David Kilcullen is a central figure.

Kilcullen speaks honestly about the Iraq War

“A Counterinsurgency Guide for Politicos“, Spencer Ackerman, The Washington Independent, 28 July 2008 — Eighth in a Series: The Rise of the Counterinsurgents.  Excerpt:

After nearly seven years of costly strategic ignorance in the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a coming handbook written mostly by a former top aide to Gen. David H. Petraeus seeks to instruct senior civilian policy-makers about the complexities of counterinsurgency.

“Counterinsurgency: A Guide for Policy-Makers” takes the lessons learned by the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan and elevates them to the highest levels of national strategy.

… Asked for comment, the handbook’s chief author, David Kilcullen, a former Australian Army officer who is now an adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, explained that it tells policy-makers to “think very, very carefully before intervening.” More bluntly, Kilcullen, who helped Petraeus design his 2007 counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, called the decision to invade Iraq “stupid” — in fact, he said “fucking stupid” ** — and suggested that if policy-makers apply the manual’s lessons, similar wars can be avoided in the future.

“The biggest stupid idea,” Kilcullen said, “was to invade Iraq in the first place.”

Militia – the ultimate defense against 4GW

Summary:  This essay sketches out what might be our most reliable defense against 4GW — a militia.  Militia have deep roots in western history, and many of these advantages can work for America today.  Militia also are problematic for several reasons.  These issues must be considered when designing their recruitment, training, and organization.  This is a slightly revised version of an essay published in September 2005.

Contents

1. Why militia?
2. Strategic Implications
3. The right tool for the right war
4. History of the Militia
5. An American militia for the 21st Century
6. Role of an American Militia
7. Who controls the Militia?What can Militia do for America?
8. What can Militia do for America?
9. Politics of Militia
10. Militia as a Dangerous Innovation
11. Militia as nucleus for vigilantes
12. Private Military Companies (aka mercenaries, in a new form for the age of 4GW)
13. Decline of the State
14. Conclusions
15. Afterword and for more information

(1)  Why militia?

The home court advantage is powerful in 4GW.  Since Mao brought 4GW to maturity, local forces waging 4GW often defeat better organized, trained and equipped foreign forces.  Another way to say this:  in 4GW defense is the strongest mode of warfare, as it has often been in the past.  COIN expert David Killcullen implicitly recognised this in the first article of his famous and widely cited “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency” Military Review, May – June 2006.

Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture.  Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance.  Your task is to become the world expert on your district.

The superiority of defense is not a new aspect of war, as seen in these quotes from Clausewitz’s On War.

As we shall show, defense is a stronger form of fighting than attack. … I am convinced that the superiority of the defensive (if rightly understood) is very great, far greater than appears at first sight.
{Book 1, Chapter 1}

Another “must-read” presentation by Kilcullen about COIN

Future historians will be after to follow our efforts in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars relying only on the works of David Kilcullen, Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State, officer in the Australian Army, anthropologist, top expert in counter-insurgency. (See below for a bio).  His writing, along with that of a small number of other COIN theorists, has driven much of our strategy and tactics.  His latest presentation will, I hope, continue to do so.  it may prove one of his most important.

“Dinosaurs versus Mammals: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Adaptation in Iraq“, RAND Insurgency Board, 8 May 2008 (posted at Sic Semper Tyrannis).  Here are excerpts, a few titles of the slides.  This is a brilliant and subtle presentation, which a summary cannot capture.

Opening slide: An unforgiving environment that punishes error — Leading to Darwinian pressure on both sides…

Slide 16:  Hypothesis: counterinsurgents adapt slowly, insurgents evolve quickly?

Slide 17:  Hypothesis: mechanisms for insurgent evolution

• General evolutionary effect
• Leadership evolution (destruction-replenishment cycle)
• Bell Curve effect

Slide 52:  Conclusions

1. In a counterinsurgency, insurgent groups and security forces appear to engage in time- and resource-competitive processes of adaptation, driven by the Darwinian pressure imposed by a complex, hostile “conflict ecosystem” that operates on the edge of chaos
2. Counterinsurgents appear mainly to adapt, insurgents to evolve – but insurgent groups whose network and organizational structure is tighter may behave in a more purposeful adaptive manner (e.g. JAM)

I was wrong about SecDef Gates – here is a more accurate view of him

I apologize to those of you who read yesterday’s post about Secretary of Defense Gates.  I read his recent speeches with my mind closed.  Fortunately Tom Engelhardt sees what the rest of us overlook.  Following his suggestion, consider Gates’ 4 April speech at West Point.

Last year I read Partners in Command, a book by Mark Perry. It is an account of the unique relationship between Eisenhower and General George Marshall … one of the things I found compelling is how they were both influenced by another senior Army officer who is not nearly as well-known and in fact, as a reader of history, I had never heard of.

His name is Fox Conner, a tutor and mentor to both Eisenhower and Marshall. … From Conner, Marshall and Eisenhower learned much about leadership and the conduct of war. Conner had three principles of war for a democracy that he imparted to Eisenhower and Marshall. They were:

• Never fight unless you have to;
• Never fight alone;
• And never fight for long.

All things being equal, these principles are pretty straightforward and strategically sound. We’ve heard variants of them in the decades since, perhaps most recently in the Powell doctrine.

But of course, all things are not equal, particularly when you think about the range and complexity of the threats facing America today, from the wars we are in to the conflicts we are most likely to fight. So tonight I’d like to discuss with you how you should think about applying Fox Conner’s three axioms to the security challenges of the 21st century, the challenges where you will be on the front lines.

Gates then explains that we will no longer follow these principles — and will do the opposite.  This is the build-up to the heart of the speech (bold emphasis added):

Roads in Afghanistan, a new weapon to win 4GW’s?

A new article by Dr. David Kilcullen: “Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency“, posted at the Small Wars Council (24 April 2008) — “Road-Building in Afghanistan, Part 1 of a Series on Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency”

Over the past eight years Kilcullen has laid a profound theoretical foundation for COIN on which he has written many articles rich with operational insights and recommendations. Here is a full archive of his work: The Essential 4GW reading list: David Kilcullen.

One fascinating aspect of Kilcullen’s work is the relative absence of critical review. Such attention is usually an indicator of significance, and his work is powerful in both an intellectual and operational sense. Why so little analytical attention? Even Newton and Einstein had their critics.

I posted this question (and a link to my archive of Kilcullen’s work) in the comments at both the Small Wars Journal and at Zenpundit. The SWJ Editor(s) deleted both (too disturbing to the troops, perhaps). At the Zenpundit there were two replies. First, from the Zenpundit himself: